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THE STORY OF RU-486 IN THE UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
On September 28, 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (the \FDA") approved mifepristone1 as a safe
and eective nonsurgical method for terminating early intrauterine pregnancy up to 49 days after the rst
day of a woman's last menstrual period.2 From its initial development in France in 1980 to its ocial entry
into the U.S. pharmaceutical market in September 2000, RU-486's 20-year journey has included numerous
false starts and stops, a slow and politicized approval process, and enduring controversy. In a word, the
story of RU-486 has been eventful. As each chapter in the story of RU-486 unfolded over the course of
its 20-year odyssey, what started out as a mundane story about a scientic discovery in the laboratories of
1Mifepristone is the generic name of the rst drug in the abortion pill combination that is commonly called RU-486. The
term RU-486 is derived from the initials of Roussel-Uclaf, the French pharmaceutical company that developed the abortion
pill, plus a serial number. See Philip J. Hilts, Success with Abortion Drug Reported, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1986, at C1, C19.
In addition, RU-486 is known by its commercial name, Mifeprex, and by its brand name, Mifegyne. See Neal E. Boudette,
German Firm to Give Up Rights to Controversial Abortion Pill, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 2000, at A22.
2See, e.g., Rachel Zimmerman, FDA Gets Questions About Abortion Pill From Congressman, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 2000,
at B2.
3France quickly erupted into a controversial saga. This saga included allegations of fraud, a dozen lawsuits, a
price tag of at least $50 million, political maneuvering both on a local and international level, and a delicate
tension between the dictates of science, morality, the law, and public opinion.
In this paper, I will navigate you through the fascinating odyssey of RU-486 from its initial development
in France to its ocial entry into the U.S. pharmaceutical market to the post-approval strife in which it
is now embroiled. While many assumed that the FDA's approval of RU-486 on September 28, 2000 would
mark the nal chapter in the story of the drug's acceptance as an early pregnancy termination procedure,
it actually marked the beginning of a new chapter, which ignited congressional eorts to stymie, or even
abort, the growth of this chemical alternative to surgical abortion in the United States. As a result of these
congressional eorts, the last chapter in the story of RU-486 remains to be written.
I. THE BIRTH OF A CONTROVERSY
A. Background: What is RU-486 and How Does It Work?
Mifepristone is an antiprogesterone agent that blocks progesterone from attaching to the wall of the uterus
by binding to the progesterone receptors in the decidual lining of the uterus. It serves as a progesterone
impostor, thereby preventing the real progesterone hormones from attaching to the uterine wall.3 Proges-
terone is a hormone that conditions the endometrium, or mucous membrane lining the uterus, to accept and
retain the fertilized egg.4 The absence of progesterone in the uterus due to its competitive inhibition by
mifepristone at the receptor site causes the uterine lining to break down and secrete prostaglandins,5 which
3See, e.g., Karen F. Richards, RU-486: A Promising Birth Control Device Entangled in the Abortion Debate, 6 J. Pharmacy
& L. 117, 118 (1997).
4See, e.g., Csilla Muhl, RU-486: Legal and Policy Issues Confronting the Food and Drug Administration, 14 J. Legal Med.
319, 327 (1993).
5A prostaglandin is an oxygenated unsaturated cyclic fatty acid that controls blood pressure or smoothes muscle contractions.
4produce muscle contractions that dislodge the fertilized egg from the uterus.6
To more fully understand RU-486, it is important to understand how its treatment process works. Under the
FDA-approved RU-486 treatment regimen, a woman who desires to undergo a nonsurgical early pregnancy
termination must make three visits to a doctor's oce or clinic over a two-week period. During her rst visit,
she takes 600 milligrams of mifepristone (three 200-milligram pills) by mouth. Two days later, she returns
for 400 micrograms (two 200-microgram pills) of misoprostol, an FDA-approved oral prostaglandin that fur-
ther induces uterine contractions, thereby helping to complete the process of expulsion of the fertilized egg.
The reason behind the sequential administration of mifepristone and misoprostol is that the prostaglandin
analogue, misoprostol, increases uterine muscle contractility beyond that which the progesterone-inhibiting
action of mifepristone is able to accomplish.7 The patient then returns for her third and nal visit approx-
imately 14 days after her rst visit for a determination of whether the fertilized egg has been completely
expelled from the uterus.8 If the RU-486 regimen does not completely expel the products of conception, a
supervising doctor advises the patient to undergo methods of surgical intervention such as suction, dilatation
and curettage, or vacuum aspiration to complete the expulsion process.
See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 937 (10th ed. 1999).
6See Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Division of Reproductive and Urologic Drug
Products, Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Signicant Impact for NDA 20-687, Mifepristone Tablets (July 9,
1996); Kari Hanson, Approval of RU-486 as a Postcoital Contraceptive, 17 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 163, 169 (1993).
7See, e.g., Remi Peyron, M.D., et al., Early Termination of Pregnancy with Mifepristone (RU 486) and Oral or Vaginal
Misoprostol, 332 New Eng. J. Med. 984 (1995).
8HHS News, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, FDA Approves Mifepristone for the Termination of Early
Pregnancy (Sept. 28, 2000), available at <http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/new00737.html>.
5B. The French Abortion Pill FuryThe origins of the RU-486 treat-
ment regimen that I just described began in 1970 when French
researchers discovered that antiprogestin receptors in the uterus
interacting with the progesterone hormone could induce abortion.9
A decade later, in 1980, a research team at the French pharmaceu-
tical company, Roussel-Uclaf, which included Drs.  Etienne- Emile
Baulieu, Alain Belanger, Beatrice Couzinet, and Gilbert Schai-
son, as well as Roussel-Uclaf's chief chemist and director of en-
docrine research, George Teutsch, invented a synthetic drug labeled
Roussel-Uclaf 38486 at the Hospital of Bicetre in Bicetre, France.
They soon nicknamed the drug \RU-486."10 The results of clinical
trials conducted during the early and mid-1980's showed that the
drug was safe and eective for use in early pregnancy termination.
On September 23, 1988, after six years of clinical study, the French
Ministry of Solidarity, Health, and Social Welfare approved RU-486
for distribution in France as an abortifacient.11
Only a month later, however, on October 25, 1988, threatened
boycotts of all of its products and loud protests denouncing the
banalization of abortion prompted Roussel-Uclaf to withdraw RU-
486 from the French market and suspend plans to distribute the
pill in France and elsewhere.12 Despite Roussel-Uclaf's initial en-
thusiasm to market the drug, some key gures within the pharma-
ceutical company, particularly Dr. Edouard Sakiz, Roussel-Uclaf's
chairman, began to reconsider the company's decision, especially in
light of the fact that severe economic repercussions could befall the
company if those threatened boycotts actually materialized.13 Fur-
ther, Roussel-Uclaf's German parent company, Hoechst AG, which
owned a $6 billion-a-year American subsidiary, Hoechst Celanese,
pressured Roussel-Uclaf to discontinue the marketing of RU-486
because it feared that burgeoning threats of boycotts, if actual-
ized, could be ruinous to the business of its American subsidiary
company.14 Privately, Hoechst ocials also expressed concern that
the pro-life movement's statements that Hoechst and Roussel-Uclaf
were responsible for exterminating fetuses in an act of \chemical
warfare against the unborn" just as the Nazis had exterminated
the Jews through the use of cyanide gas could impose irreversible
reputational damage upon the company.15 This was particularly
sensitive to Hoechst because its ancestor company, I.G. Farben,
had produced the cyanide gas, Zyklon B, for use in the Nazi death
camps.16 In the face of these pressures from Hoechst, in addition
to his and Roussel-Uclaf's own fears of economic reprisal and neg-
ative publicity, Dr. Sakiz assembled Roussel-Uclaf's management
committee to vote on the future of RU-486's distribution in France.
At the meeting, the committee, with Sakiz in agreement, voted to
suspend distribution of the drug.17
In the days that followed Roussel-Uclaf's withdrawal, the polemic
surrounding the abortion debate intensied. While pro-life advo-
cates applauded the decision as an end to the chemical warfare
against the unborn, abortion rights advocates denounced Roussel-
Uclaf's pusillanimity and criticized its action as a capitulation to
moral fundamentalism and as an unconscionable infringement of a
woman's freedom of reproductive choice. For two days following
the company's decision to discontinue the distribution of RU-486,
the French abortion pill controversy not only inspired heated de-
bate; it also dominated the world stage of medical politics. In
response to what they perceived to be a massive disservice to sci-
entic progress, thousands of delegates from 83 countries in atten-
dance at the Twelfth World Congress of Gynecology and Obstet-
rics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil circulated a petition demanding that
Roussel-Uclaf surrender its world patent on RU-486 immediately.18
Soon thereafter, galvanized by the actions of the Twelfth World
Congress, Claude Evin, the French Minister of Solidarity, Health,
and Social Welfare, decided to interject the French government into
the controversy by ordering the distribution of the pill in France
on the grounds that the drug had become \the moral property of
women" and by threatening to withdraw Roussel-Uclaf's patent
on RU-486 if it did not comply with this governmental mandate.19
Responding to both the French governmental mandate and inter-
national pressure, Roussel-Uclaf quickly agreed to distribute the
drug in France. However, the company also decided to institute a
stringent treatment protocol,20 which reected its continued wari-
ness over the potential for economic reprisal, liability exposure,
and anti-abortion protests, and vowed to market the drug only in
countries where the abortion issue was not so politically explosive.21
II. POLITICS AND CHEMISTRY MAKE A VOLATILE MIX-
TURE:
\KEEPING THE ABORTION PILL BOTTLED UP IN FRANCE"
A. Moral ConcernsAfter this tumultuous period in France, RU-
486's eventful story had a brief intermission. No major pharma-
ceutical company, including Roussel-Uclaf and its U.S. subsidiary,
Hoechst-Roussel Pharmaceuticals Inc., sought FDA approval to
market the drug in the United States. A host of factors converged
to keep the abortion pill bottled up in France. For one, the abortion
debate had been even more vociferous in the United States than
in France. On the one hand, the pill's detractors called it a ruse, a
medically awed drug, or, on another front, a death pill causing the
destruction of innocent human life. The groups stressing the latter
position argued that a fetus is a living being, belonging to the hu-
man species and fully deserving of love and protection. The pill's
promoters, on the other hand, stressed a woman's constitutional
right to abortion in the wake of Roe v. Wade22 and contended that
a woman should have the right to a more private, less invasive,
and less psychologically traumatic alternative to surgical abortion.
This side argued that to conscript a woman into carrying a fetus to
term was to force upon her the physical and psychological bonds
of motherhood in a most fundamental deprivation of constitutional
liberty and sexual and reproductive autonomy.B. Corporate Amer-
ica's Lack of InterestWhatever the merit of these moral arguments,
American corporations chose not to get involved in the RU-486 con-
troversy due to standard business concerns, including the potential
for sustained boycotts, enormous research and development costs,
and perhaps most importantly, liability exposure. In fact, corpo-
rate America's suspicion of the potential for boycotts was conrmed
when the former head of the National Right to Life Committee,
John Wilke, asserted that \any company marketing an abortion
agent in the United States would be hit with an instant, massive,
national boycott of every product they make, except those where
there are no other alternative drugs."23 In addition to the potential
for extensive boycotts, the expense of steering a drug through re-
search, clinical investigation, and the FDA approval process helped
discourage American corporate involvement in the RU-486 enter-
prise. The cost of research and development usually lies anywhere
between $30 million and $70 million, if not more. Moreover, the
entire process, including the usually long and laborious FDA ap-
proval process, can take as long as 17 years due to a number of
factors, including the FDA's stringent testing protocols.24 Because
drug patents have a life of 17 years, subject to certain exceptions,25
and it can sometimes take almost that long to bring a drug to
market, the period of market exclusivity for a drug can be rather
short, leaving only a short margin of time to recapture a costly
investment. Therefore, given this potential for a rather low prot
margin, American corporations saw the investment of time, labor,
and especially money in marketing a drug that ultimately had the
possibility of not yielding sucient prot as an unsound business
decision. Finally and perhaps the most devastating blow to Amer-
ican corporate interest in RU-486 was the increase in the litigious
character of American society. Few industries have been harder
hit by lawsuits and multi-million dollar court awards than those
involving contraception and reproduction. For example, in 1986,
a federal judge awarded a Georgia woman $5,151,030 in damages
against the Ortho Pharmaceutical Co. after she claimed that its
spermicide, Ortho-Gynol, caused her child's birth defects.26 Simi-
larly, the high cost of liability suits against the Dalkon Shield and
Copper-7 intrauterine devices served to chill research in the ar-
eas of contraception and reproduction. Litigation settlements in
the Dalkon Shield controversy alone exceeded $2.48 billion.27 Pre-
dictably, American corporations were not eager to become ensnared
in a project that could ultimately cost them billions of dollars in
liability suits alone, not to mention the millions of dollars needed
to conduct research and development. In summary, the threat of
economically debilitating boycotts, the enormous costs of research-
ing, testing, and shepherding a drug through the FDA approval
process, and the potential for massive liability exposure converged
to create an atmosphere that was not conducive to the prospect
of American corporate involvement in the potentially unprotable
RU-486 enterprise.
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence's Impact on RU-486
In addition to corporate America's lack of interest in RU-486, the judicial climate in the United States during
9See Amy D. Porter, International Reproductive Rights: The RU 486 Question, 18 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 179, 189
(1995).
10Philip J. Hilts, Success with Abortion Drug Reported, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1986, at C1, C19.
11See Porter, supra note 9, at 194. An abortifacient is any substance that causes or induces abortion. See Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 3 (10th ed. 1999).
12See, e.g., Muhl, supra note 4, at 320-21.
13Steven Greenhouse, The Uphill Battle to Market the French Abortion Pill, S.F. Chron., Feb. 26, 1989.
6the late 1980's became increasingly adverse to abortion, which in turn had implications for the introduction of
RU-486 in the United States. On July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services28
upheld a Missouri law that imposed restrictions on abortion, such as requiring doctors to perform tests for
fetus viability at 20 weeks (and prohibiting abortion at the 20-week mark if the fetus were found to be
viable), and barring the use of public hospitals or clinics for abortion services.29 Most importantly, however,
14Id.
15Ellen Goodman, Politics, Technology a Volatile Mixture, Portland Oregonian, July 25, 1989.
16Steven Greenhouse, A New Pill, A Fierce Battle, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1989.
17Steven Greenhouse, The Uphill Battle to Market the French Abortion Pill, S.F. Chron., Feb. 26, 1989.
18See Porter, supra note 9, at 195.
19See  Etienne- Emile Baulieu & Mort Rosenblum, The Abortion Pill: RU-486, A Woman's Choice 13 (1990). The 1988 con-
troversy surrounding the distribution of RU-486 in France was not the rst time France had become embroiled in a vituperative
debate over the abortion issue. Abortion has been legal in France since 1975. When abortion was legalized, a bitter debate
arose between conservative Catholics and supporters of legalized abortion, including the Socialist Party. The controversy ignited
again briey in 1984 when the French public health system decided to reimburse abortion costs. See Edward Cody, France
Orders Sale of New Pill: Abortion Drug Had Been Shelved After Angry Protests, Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1988, at A1.
20The strict treatment protocol included four visits to a doctor's oce or clinic with the rst three visits occurring within
the required seven-week gestation limit. During the rst medical visit, the woman registered, underwent a pregnancy test and
ultrasound to conrm the pregnancy, and signed a consent form. See Porter, supra note 9, at 193. The consent form contained
a provision advising surgical intervention should the RU-486 regimen fail to result in complete expulsion of the fertilized egg
or fail to terminate the pregnancy altogether. See id. During the second visit, which occurred after the one-week reection
period mandated by French law, the woman took 600 milligrams of RU-486 in the form of three pills. See id. Approximately
48 hours later, she returned to the facility to receive the prostaglandin and remained at the facility for an additional four to six
hours for observation. See id. Seven to ten days later, the woman returned for her nal visit in order to conrm the successful
termination of the pregnancy. See id.
21See, e.g., Richards, supra note 3, at 126. Roussel-Uclaf especially wished to avoid marketing RU-486 in the United States.
For one, given the intensity of the anti-abortion movement's sentiment in the United States and its vows to inict economic
reprisal on any pharmaceutical company that marketed the \abortion pill," Roussel-Uclaf could become the target of extensive
boycotts of all of its products. Additionally, the privatization and decentralization of the U.S. health care system hindered the
implementation and enforcement of stringent governmental controls over the treatment regimen, thereby raising signicant safety
and liability concerns for any company wishing to distribute the drug. See RU-486, Status Report on the U.S. Commercialization
Project, Transfer of Anti-Progestin Technology to the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Business
Opportunities, and Technology of the House Comm. on Small Business, 103rd Cong. 1 (1994).
22410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23See, e.g., Muhl, supra note 4, at 337.
24Laura Fraser, The `Abortion Pill': Why America Trails Europe, Newsday, July 5, 1988, at 49.
25See The Patent Term Restoration Review Procedure Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 1172 Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Peter Barton Hutt, Partner, Covington & Burling).
26Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985); see also Carl Djerassi, The Future of Birth
Control: Our Present Methods Are Outdated and Unless We Act Now, They'll Never Be Better, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1989,
at C1.
27See, e.g., Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Minn. 1989); see also Dolly M. Trompeter, Comment,
Sex, Drugs, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 6(c): Why Comment E is the Answer to the Woman Question, 48
Am. U. L. Rev. 1139, 1164-65 (1999). Ironically, feminists and women's health collectives, the groups most actively involved
in promoting RU-486, were responsible for encouraging and even funding litigation in the Dalkon Shield crisis, which had the
unexpected eect of chilling RU-486 research and distribution in the United States.
28492 U.S. 490 (1989).
29See id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring). A year after Webster, in a pair of cases, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417
(1990) and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990), the Court further limited the strength of Roe
in addressing the issue of parental notication in teenage abortion cases. In Hodgson, the Court ruled that a state may require
7the Court's establishment of a new \undue burden" standard in Webster suggested that a majority of the
Court did not consider abortion to be a fundamental constitutional right.30 This new standard served as
an invitation to state legislators to test just how far the Supreme Court would permit them to go.31 As a
result, between 1989 and 1992, more than 700 bills were introduced in various state legislatures to regulate
access to abortion.
The undue burden analysis became the centerpiece of the Supreme Court's ruling in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.32
Casey marked the rst time since Roe that the Supreme Court allowed infringements on the right to choose
that directly aect all women seeking abortion services.33 In Casey, the Court reversed its decisions in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists34 and City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,35
on the question of waiting periods, holding that important decisions will be more informed and deliberate
if they follow some period of reection... particularly where [a] statute directs that important information
become part of the background of the decision.36 In addition, the Court upheld its previous approval of
statutory requirements that allowed certain informational material to be issued to a patient.37 Consequently,
in response to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in these areas, state legislatures promulgated statutes that
a teenage girl to notify both parents before obtaining an abortion so long as the law also provides the alternative of a judicial
hearing. See 497 U.S. at 422. A minor could, however, get a judicial bypass if at the judicial hearing the minor could convince
the judge that she was mature and capable of giving informed consent. See id. Likewise, in Akron, the Court upheld a state
law requiring notication of one parent because the statute also provided a judicial bypass procedure through which a minor
could obtain a waiver of the notice provision if she presented clear and convincing evidence that she was mature enough to
make the decision herself, that one of her parents had abused her, or that the notication was not in her best interest. See 497
U.S. at 507-08.
30A.J. Stone, III, Consti-Tortion: Tort Law as an End-Run Around Abortion Right After Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 8
Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 471, 476 (2000).
31Marcy J. Wilder, The Rule of Law, The Rise of Violence, and the Role of Morality: Reframing America's Abortion Debate
in Abortion Wars: A Half Century of Struggle 85 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).
32505 U.S. 833 (1992).
33Kathryn Kolbert & Andrea Miller, Legal Strategies for Abortion Rights in the Twenty-First Century, in Abortion Wars:
A Half Century of Struggle 98 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).
34476 U.S. 747 (1986).
35462 U.S. 416 (1983).
36505 U.S. at 885.
37See 505 U.S. at 882 (nding that the distribution of factual literature relating to abortion is permissi-
ble, overruling Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) and arming
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976) (allowing mandatory informed consent provisions of
statute because such information tells the patient just what would be done and... its consequences).
8mandated waiting periods for patients and required patients to receive informational material before ob-
taining an abortion.38 While the Court in Casey stated that [n]o development of constitutional law... has
implicitly or explicitly left Roe behind, the Court's new \undue burden" standard limited the applicability
of the fundamental right/strict-scrutiny approach in Roe in place of a less denite standard that allowed
more restrictions on abortions.39
Thus, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence had two signicant implications for the future of RU-486 in the
United States. On the one hand, these decisions heightened concerns within the abortion rights commu-
nity that the Supreme Court's erosion of the Roe framework exhibited its inclination to not only restrict
access to current methods of abortion but also to impede the introduction of any new methods of abortion
in the United States. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence raised signicant questions
about whether the RU-486 treatment regimen would even be subject to the same statutory requirements
as surgical abortion. In light of this uncertainty, the abortion rights advocates' need for a more private,
nonsurgical alternative to abortion took on new immediacy, especially if the RU-486 treatment regimen had
even a remote possibility of eschewing statutory regulation.
D. Abortion Politics Goes Conservative
Meanwhile, the executive branch of the federal government, which was enjoying signicant success and
popularity throughout the 1980's, vigorously opposed the introduction of RU-486 into the United States
on the grounds that it morally diluted the act of abortion. In addition to opposing RU-486, the Reagan
and Bush Administrations overturned many federally nanced abortion programs that abortion advocates
viewed as fundamental. For example, they outlawed some federal support for fertility research, discontinued
38See Stone, supra note 30, at 477-78.
39505 U.S. at 857; see also Stone, supra note 30, at 476-77.
9the nancing of leading international family planning organizations, and forbade the counseling of women in
federally nanced clinics about the possibility of abortion. Given both Presidents' opposition to surgical and
nonsurgical abortion and abortion-related services, they stood as major roadblocks in RU-486's path toward
approval in the United States, especially since they had the authority to control the direction of FDA policy
by appointing Commissioners who shared their attitudes toward abortion.
E. Regulatory Restrictions on Abortion
Finally, on the regulatory front, the FDA implemented severe pre-approval restrictions on RU-486. By way
of background, Section 381 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which was enacted in 1938, prohibits
the importation of unapproved new drugs into the United States.40 By July 1988, however, the FDA, out
of a concern for persons with AIDS and cancer who needed potentially life-saving unapproved new drugs,
launched a pilot program called Pilot Guidance. Pilot Guidance allowed the importation of some unapproved
new drugs so long as they were imported in small quantities for personal use and did not present unreasonable
safety risks or evidence of fraud.41 On September 26, 1988, Burton Love, director of the Division of Field
Investigations for the FDA, issued an import bulletin, which excluded RU-486 from the Pilot Guidance
program.
Soon after its initial implementation, on February 1, 1989, Pilot Guidance was expanded through revision
40See 21 U.S.C. x 381 (1999).
41Debora C. Fliegelman, The FDA and RU486: Are Politics Compatible With the FDA's Mandate of Protecting Public
Health and Safety?, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 143, 149 (1993). The personal use exemption, as it is commonly called, allows the
FDA to exercise its discretion in allowing the importation of drugs not covered under an approved New Drug Application
(\NDA") so long as the imported articles satisfy certain conditions. See Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and
Drug Law: Cases and Materials 562 (2d ed. 1991). While such products are presumptively subject to refusal, the FDA may
allow their importation without sampling or detention if: (1) the product was purchased for personal use; (2) the product is not
for commercial distribution; (3) the amount of the product is not excessive; (4) the intended use of the product is appropriately
identied; (4) the patient arms in writing that the product is for her own personal use and provides the name and address
of the doctor licensed in the United States responsible for her treatment with the product; and (5) the product presents no
unreasonable safety risks or evidence of fraud. See id. Products that are not identied, are not accompanied by appropriate
documentation of intended use, are imported in large quantities inconsistent with the personal use requirement, have been
fraudulently promoted or misrepresented, or present an unreasonable health risk due to toxicity or contamination should be
detained under FDA guidelines. See id.
10of the Regulatory Procedures Manual42 to cover drugs for life-threatening or serious conditions whether or
not AIDS or cancer-related.43 This expansion of the program briey left open the possibility that RU-486
could be imported into the United States under the personal use exemption before obtaining FDA approval.
On June 6, 1989, however, about a month after 11 members of Congress lobbied the FDA Commissioner
for an even more explicit exclusion of RU-486 from the personal use exemption list, the FDA implemented
Import Alert 66-47, which barred RU-486's entry into the United States and excluded it from the FDA's
personal use exemption list because of RU-486's purported health and safety implications.44 Import Alert
66-47 directed eld workers to immediately detain any imported abortifacient drugs.45 Amidst increasing
concern that RU-486 could not be imported even for research purposes, the FDA, in a hearing before the
House Small Business Subcommittee, claried that its import ban targeted individuals who either carried
the drug into the country personally or received it in the mail and that the ban did not cover importation
of the drug for research purposes.46
Predictably, in light of the seemingly interminable trials and tribulations in the story of RU-486, the FDA's
import ban did not go unchallenged. On July 1, 1992, in an organized act of deance, Leona Benten, a social
worker from California who was six-weeks pregnant, arrived at New York's Kennedy International Airport
from London with 12 RU-486 pills.47 The group that had organized Ms. Benten's act of deance alerted
customs ocials the morning of her arrival that Ms. Benten was carrying the banned drugs into the country,
and upon her arrival at the airport, the customs ocials seized her pills.48 Ms. Benten immediately moved
for an injunction requiring the FDA and the customs ocials to return her pills.49
42See Food & Drug Administration, FDA/ORA Regulatory Procedures Manual, ch. 9, Subchapter on Coverage of Personal
Importations (rev. May 12, 1998), available at <http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9pers.html>.
43See, e.g., Muhl, supra note 4, at 335.
44Ron Wyden, Let the Pill into the U.S., N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1991, at A25.
45Fliegelman, supra note 41, at 149.
46Philip J. Hilts, FDA Says It Allows Study of Abortion Drug, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1990, at C9.
47Philip J. Hilts, Abortion Pills Are Conscated By U.S., N.Y. Times, July 2, 1992, at A12.
48Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Is Sued Over Ban on Importing Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1992, at A16.
49See Benten v. Kessler, 799 F. Supp. 281, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
11On July 14, 1992, nearly two weeks after the initial confrontation and with precious time in the drug's time
limitations for eective use slipping away, a U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of New York,
Charles P. Sifton, refused to order the government to lift its import ban, but granted Ms. Benten's request for
an injunction.50 The court found that the FDA's import ban was a substantive rule under the Administrative
Procedure Act (the \APA") and was therefore subject to the notice and comment requirements of the APA.51
Given this procedural impropriety, the court held that the FDA could not legitimately seize Ms. Benten's
pills without having implemented the import ban through the notice and comment procedures required for
the enactment of substantive rules.52 Alternatively, the Benten court held that even if the import ban was
not a substantive rule under the APA, the FDA's own rules required notice and comment whenever any
departure from standard agency practice occurred.53 Before the conscated pills could be returned to Ms.
Benten, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed the lower court's order.54 The
nal word on the status of Ms. Benten's imported pills came from the highest court in the land. On July
17, 1992, the Supreme Court, in a 7-to-2 vote, with Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissenting, held that
Ms. Benten failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that Import Alert
66-47 was promulgated without the proper notice and comment procedures required by the APA or FDA
regulations and thereby upheld the Court of Appeals' stay.55 As a result of the Supreme Court's ruling,
the government did not return Ms. Benten's pills, the FDA's import ban continued, and perhaps most
50See id. at 291.
51See id. at 290-91. The court also stated that the FDA's importation ban was likely based not from any bona de concern
for the safety of users of the drug, but on political considerations having no place in FDA decisions on health and safety. Id.
at 286.
52See id. at 291.
53See id. at 290.
54505 U.S. 1084, 1084 (1992); see also Philip J. Hilts, Justices Uphold Federal Seizure of Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times, July 18,
1992, at A1. In the increasingly political battle over RU-486, the battle lines had been drawn along predictable political party
lines. The decision favoring Leona Benten came from U.S. District Judge, Charles P. Sifton, a President Carter appointee, while
the stay was enacted by a panel of three judges, John M. Walker, President Bush's cousin and a Bush appointee, and Frank
X. Altimari and Daniel J. Mahoney, both President Reagan appointees. See Philip J. Hilts, Judge Overturns Federal Seizure
of Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1992, at A1.
55See 505 U.S. 1084, 1085 (1992).
12signicantly, the abortion pill remained bottled up in France.56
III. THE ABORTION TIDE BEGINS TO TURN
A. A New Administration
After more than a decade of anti-abortion executive administrations and an FDA unreceptive to the possibil-
ity of RU-486's entrance into the U.S. pharmaceutical market, a change in political administrations in 1993
signaled a sea change in U.S. abortion policy. In one of his rst acts as President, and on the 20th anniversary
of Roe v. Wade, President William J. Clinton directed the FDA to determine whether sucient evidence
existed to warrant exclusion of RU-486 from the list of drugs that qualify for the personal use importation
exemption. Under President Clinton's directive, if the FDA concluded that RU-486 satised the criteria
for the personal use exemption, it was instructed to immediately rescind Import Alert 66-47.57 Moreover,
he directed the FDA to assess initiatives to promote the testing of RU-486 and other antiprogestins and to
investigate possible licensing and manufacturing arrangements for the drug in the United States. 58 In at-
tempting to reverse a decade of Republican anti-abortion decrees, President Clinton also repealed the ban on
abortion counseling at federally funded clinics, lifted restrictions on fetal tissue research, reversed a Reagan
Administration prohibition on aid to international family planning programs that provide abortion-related
services, and eliminated a ban on all abortions in U.S. military hospitals.59
56Despite the import ban, a cancer patient, J. David Grow, who had inoperable meningioma and who testied before a
Congressional subcommittee on July 28, 1992 that the unapproved abortion pill might prolong his life, received government
permission to obtain the drug from its French manufacturer. See Claire L. Ahern, Drug Approval in the United States and
England: A Question of Medical Safety or Moral Persuasion? { The RU-486 Example, 17 Suolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 93, 104
n.62 (1994); Gina Kolata, Cancer Patient Can Get Unapproved Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1992, at A22.
57Memorandum for the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Importation of RU-486, 58 Fed. Reg. 7459 (1993).
58Notice, Department of Health and Human Services, Oce of the Secretary, Actions Regarding Family Planning Service
Projects, Transplantation of Human Fetal Tissue, and Importation of the Drug Mifepristone, 58 Fed. Reg. 7468 (1993).
59Robin Toner, Settling In: Easing Abortion Policy; Clinton Orders Reversal of Abortion Restrictions Left by Reagan and
Bush, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1993, at A1.
13Although the political landscape was becoming increasingly favorable toward the introduction of RU-486
in the United States, the pill's French manufacturer, and in particular the French manufacturer's German
parent company, remained hesitant to introduce the drug in the United States or even to license it to a
pharmaceutical company in the United States, for fear of the lurking economic and political ramications.
Responding to Roussel-Uclaf's and Hoechst's reticence, the Clinton Administration, along with FDA Com-
missioner at the time, Dr. David A. Kessler, initiated proactive eorts to change both Roussel-Uclaf's and
Hoechst's minds.60 In fact, on February 24, 1993, pharmaceutical executive, Dr. Edouard Sakiz of Roussel-
Uclaf, met with Dr. Kessler at FDA headquarters in Rockville, Maryland at the FDA's request to discuss
bringing RU-486 to the American market.61 While Dr. Sakiz conceded the importance of bringing the
drug to market in the United States, he also continued to stress the company's unwillingness to be directly
involved in the process.62
B. The Involvement of the Population Council
Even as Roussel-Uclaf persisted in its refusal to market RU-486 in the United States, all hopes to bring
the drug to the U.S. pharmaceutical market were not lost. In fact, the Population Council, an American
non-prot contraceptive research group that was created in 1952 by John D. Rockefeller, III, had expressed
60Even before President Clinton and Dr. Kessler joined the eort to bring RU-486 to the United States, longtime feminist
activists Peg Yorkin, a Hollywood producer, and Eleanor Smeal, a former president of the National Organization for Women,
took 700,000 petitions to France in 1989 to persuade Roussel-Uclaf to sell the drug in the United States. See Sharon Bernstein,
Persistence Brought Abortion Pill to U.S.: Two Feminist Activists Culled Nonprot Organizations and Dedicated Individuals
To Do The Work That No Pharmaceutical Company Was Willing to Tackle, L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 2000, at A1.
61Philip J. Hilts, Door May Be Open For Abortion Pill To Be Sold In U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1993, at A1.
62See Roussel-Uclaf Discusses Possible RU-486 Launch with FDA, Pharmaceutical Bus. News, Mar. 5, 1993, at 5. In spite
of the changing political landscape in the United States, a fear of boycotts, protests, and liability exposure prevented RU-486's
French manufacturer from marketing the drug in the United States or licensing it to another company in the United States.
In an eort designed to signal to RU-486's French manufacturer that there was competition in the marketplace, a pro-choice
group, Abortion Rights Mobilization, launched a campaign seeking FDA approval for distribution of the Chinese equivalent
of the French abortion pill. American Political Network, Spotlight Story, Story RU-486: Chinese Pill To Be Tested in U.S., 4
Abortion Rep. No. 139, Feb. 17, 1993, available in WL APN-AB File. Abortion Rights Mobilization secured an agreement
from the Beijing Union Medical College to use the abortion pills it had developed and planned to begin safety testing on
animals. See Philip J. Hilts, Abortion Rights Group Uses Chinese Pill To Goad French, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1993, at B9.
Members of Abortion Rights Mobilization stated that they had already recruited a team of scientists at an unidentied New
York laboratory to make about 100 doses of the pill to begin clinical testing if Roussel-Uclaf persisted in its refusal to market
the drug in the United States. See Philip J. Hilts, Group to Copy French Abortion Pill in Bid to Speed Its Sale in U.S., N.Y.
Times, Apr. 2, 1993, at A16.
14an interest in the drug since its discovery in France in the early 1980's.63 The Population Council's interest
in RU-486 derived from its belief that unsafe abortions were a signicant public health risk to women in
developing countries and its concern that the unavailability of RU-486 would deprive women in all countries
of a safe and eective method for early medical termination of pregnancy.64 Its involvement with RU-486 and
Roussel-Uclaf ocially began in 1982 when the Council entered into an agreement with Roussel-Uclaf con-
cerning the possibility of running pre-clinical and clinical studies on RU-486 in the United States in an eort
to secure FDA approval.65 After the Population Council had obtained an Investigational New Drug Appli-
cation (IND) from the FDA for clinical testing of the safety and ecacy of RU-486, the only FDA-approved
study of RU-486 was undertaken from 1983 to 1989 at the University of Southern California.66 Fearing
similar repercussions to the French upheaval in 1988, see supra section I, part B, however, Roussel-Uclaf's
parent company, Hoechst, ordered the discontinuation of testing at the University of Southern California.67
About four years after the termination of this cooperative enterprise between the Population Council and
Roussel-Uclaf, Roussel-Uclaf nally agreed to license RU-486 in the United States to the Population Council
on April 21, 1993.68 Under the licensing agreement, the Population Council planned to sponsor a clinical
trial in the United States involving at least 2,000 women, while Roussel-Uclaf agreed to provide the FDA
with the toxicology and chemistry data from its own French clinical trial.69
63Diane L. Slifer, Growing Environmental Concerns: Is Population Control the Answer?, 11 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 111, 127 n.107
(2000).
64See RU-486, Status Report on The U.S. Commercialization Project, Transfer of Anti-Progestin Technology to the United
States Before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Technology of the House Comm. on Small Business,
103rd Cong. 80 (1994)[hereinafter Transfer Hearings] (statement of James S. Boynton, Counsel to The Population Council,
Inc.).
65See  Etienne- Emile Baulieu & Mort Rosenblum, The Abortion Pill: RU-486, A Woman's Choice 30 (1990).
66See Sylvia A. Law, Tort Liability and the Availability of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices in the United States, 23 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 339, 391 (1997); see also Transfer Hearings, supra note 64, at 80.
67See Law, supra note 66, at 390-91.
68See Warren E. Leary, Maker of Abortion Pill Reached Licensing Pact With U.S. Group, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1993, at A18.
It should be noted that Roussel-Uclaf's German parent company, Hoechst, under the chairmanship of Wolfgang Hilger, bore
the brunt of the criticism for encumbering RU-486's entry into the U.S. market. Hilger had publicly pronounced his pro-life
beliefs and had further expressed wariness over potential boycotts of the company's products and the volatility of the company's
nancial status in a characteristically litigious American society. See Fliegelman, supra note 41, at 148 n.43.
69See Warren E. Leary, Maker of Abortion Pill Reaches Licensing Pact With U.S. Group, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1993, at A8.
15In spite of the promising start to the 1993 agreement between the Population Council and Roussel-Uclaf,
plans for testing and marketing in the United States stalled. Six months after the initial licensing agreement,
Roussel-Uclaf had not yet signed a contract with the Population Council authorizing it to proceed with test-
ing.70 As the two entities remained mired in negotiations, in a move prompted by both pressure politics
and practical considerations, the Marie Stopes Health Clinic in London began oering RU-486 to American
women.71 Moreover, on May 15, 1994, after more than a year of quagmired negotiations, some members of
Congress threatened to rescind Roussel-Uclaf's U.S. patent if it did not expeditiously reach an agreement
with the Population Council. Expended from all the negotiations and political maneuvering, Roussel-Uclaf
nally decided to simply cede its patent rights without remuneration to the Population Council.72 The
agreement between the two entities arranged for the transfer of Roussel-Uclaf's patent rights and all of its
technology to the Population Council. The Council, in turn, planned to secure an American manufacturer
to produce the pill. In exchange for the donation of patent rights, RU-486's French manufacturer insulated
itself from product liability claims and anti-abortion boycotts and protests.73
C. Concern From the Pro-Life Movement
70Tamar Lewin, Plans for Abortion Pill Stalled in U.S., N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1993 at A17. Before signing the licensing
agreement, Roussel-Uclaf had publicly announced that ve conditions had to be met before it would introduce RU-486 into a
new country. Those conditions were: (1) abortion must be legal in the country; (2) the political climate must be accepting of
abortion; (3) a suitable prostaglandin must be available; (4) the health care system must be equipped to monitor patients and
the drug supply; and (5) informed consent procedures must be followed. See Porter, supra note 9, at 191. Many believed that
Roussel-Uclaf hesitated to introduce the drug into the United States because the second condition remained to be achieved.
71Tamar Lewin, British Oering Abortion Drug To U.S. Women, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1994, at A1. The British treatment
regimen was similar to the French procedure. The rst step involved a physical and ultrasound examination to verify the
pregnancy and conrm that it fell within the permitted British nine-week gestation limit. At the rst session, the patient also
received counseling. After the counseling session, two doctors' approvals were required to proceed with the treatment regimen.
Once the patient had secured the appropriate approval, she returned for a second visit, where she received three RU-486 tablets
and waited for about two hours to ensure that there were no unanticipated complications. In some cases, the woman fully
expelled the fertilized egg or fetus before the second visit. Because that was not usually the case, most women returned for
a third visit approximately 48 hours later, where they received a prostaglandin in suppository form, which induced further
contractions, thereby helping to complete the expulsion process. Under the rules in eect at the time, the patient remained
at the clinic overnight for observation and returned a week later to verify that the pregnancy had been terminated. See Nina
Darnton, Surprising Journey For Abortion Drug, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1994, at C12. The British procedure cost $500, not
including the airfare, hotel accommodations, and food for the week patients were required to remain in Britain for follow-up
care. See Lawrence Lader, RU-486, Made in America, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1994, at A23.
72See Editorial, RU-486 { Here at Last, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1994, at A18.
73See Katharine Q. Seelye, Accord Opens Way for Abortion Pill in U.S. in Two Years, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1994, at A1.
16With the conclusion of negotiations between Roussel-Uclaf and the Population Council, the arrival date of
the drug in the United States now seemed imminent. Once again, the polemic surrounding the abortion
debate intensied. Marcy Wilder, legal director of the National Abortion Rights Action League, stated that
[t]he Clinton Administration has helped end the tyranny of anti-choice extremists who for too long have held
science hostage to their religious and ideological views.74 Susan Hill, an abortion provider and president
of the National Women's Health Organization, asserted, \... mifepristone could stop this ghettoization of
abortion providers. Women [could] nally have the option of privacy in their choice. Sta and physicians
would no longer be targets but once again medical professionals providing medical services."75 In contrast,
opponents of abortion called RU-486 a human pesticide.76 Critics also charged the Clinton Administration
with inappropriately attempting to hasten the FDA approval process before the 1996 presidential election
to avoid what he considered to be negative changes that could occur under a new executive administration.
Privately, opponents of abortion feared that their worst nightmare had come true. They recoiled at the
trivialization and the dilution of the moral signicance of the act of abortion that would result if an abor-
tion could be accomplished simply by swallowing some pills. In particular, they worried that the seeming
simplicity of the procedure might encourage women to use RU-486 as a means of birth control or that the
drug might condone a mentality of sexual irresponsibility, teen pregnancy, and indelity.77
According to opponents of abortion, the drug, if approved, could irrevocably alter the national abortion
debate in a number of ways. First, in the minds of abortion opponents, the availability of RU-486 could
increase the dwindling corps of OB-GYNs willing to oer abortion services, thereby increasing the geographic
availability of abortion. This perception on the part of abortion opponents was conrmed in a 1998 study
74See id.
75New Drug Application for the Use of Mifepristone for Interruption of Early Pregnancy Before the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration's Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Committee, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (July 19, 1996) [hereinafter
New Drug Application].
76See Katharine Q. Seelye, Accord Opens Way for Abortion Pill in U.S. in Two Years, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1994, at A1.
77See Mindy J. Lees, I Want a New Drug: RU-486 and the Right to Choose, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1113, 1125 (1990).
17by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation which found that 45% of the family practitioners polled said they
were either very or somewhat likely to oer abortion services once RU-486 received FDA approval, partly
because of the anonymity associated with the prescription of a pill.78 Second, abortion opponents believed
that the distribution of an abortion pill could enhance the privacy of the abortion decision by reducing the
need for special surgical abortion clinics. This decentralization and privatization of abortion, which would
remove it from the public specter of infamous abortion clinics to unidentied, scattered doctors' oces,
ordinary medical clinics, or even the home, could have the eect of making protests outside of a specic
physical location dicult because no one would ever know where a woman was taking the pills. Third,
abortion opponents feared that the availability of an early pregnancy termination treatment regimen could
make abortions more politically tenable. For example, a 1998 New York Times/CBS News poll found that
Americans tend to favor legal abortion in the early stages of pregnancy and that support for abortion drops
precipitously as pregnancy develops.79 This theory has been supported by legal scholar Ronald Dworkin who
wrote, \[i]t is an almost universal conviction that abortion becomes steadily more problematic morally as a
fetus develops toward infanthood."80 According to Dworkin's theory, if fetal life is a progressing continuum,
then the more infant-like an aborted fetus, the greater the insult to the sanctity of human life. Dworkin's
theory was further buttressed by the contention of Douglas Johnson, the present legislative director of the
National Right to Life Committee, that technological developments have created \a window to the womb,
which makes people more cognizant of the humanity of the unborn child."81 This cognizance, in turn, has
made early abortion much more palatable to Americans than later surgical abortions when the humanity
of the aborted fetus is much more pronounced. Lastly, abortion opponents worried that the availability of
an early pregnancy termination option would marginalize the visual images that are typical in the surgical
78See Margaret Talbot, The Little White Bombshell, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1999, x 6 (Magazine), at 39.
79See id.
80See id.
81See Robin Toner, The Abortion Debate: Stuck in Time, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 2001, x 3, at 1.
18abortion context of three to six-month old fetuses with human characteristics being discarded into garbage
bags. This is because RU-486 pills are advised for women who are less than 49 days pregnant { a time when
the fetus does not have physical human characteristics. In a visually oriented society, abortion opponents
fretted that the absence of those images, and their concomitant emotional impact, in addition to the in-
creasing geographic availability and privatization of abortion, could very well recongure the politics and
perception of abortion in the United States.82
IV. THE TIDE TURNS AGAIN { The Political Pendulum Swings
to the Right
A. The Politics of Abortion Run Into The Contract With America
Despite the enduring controversy, the Population Council began its U.S. clinical trial of RU-486 in the fall of
1994 with the enrollment of 2,121 women.83 Meanwhile, until the Population Council submitted a New Drug
Application (\NDA") and had it approved by the FDA, RU-486 remained illegal in the United States.84 In
82Even though Roussel-Uclaf had removed itself from the U.S. process, a coalition of anti-abortion groups identied products
of Hoechst's U.S. aliates such as Hoechst Celanese Corp., Hoechst-Roussel Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Copley Pharmaceutical
and started a boycott of these entities' products in an eort to pressure Roussel-Uclaf and its parent company to rescind the
license it had granted to the Population Council and to dissuade American manufacturers from becoming involved in what, in
their opinion, promised to be an economically disastrous enterprise. See Elyse Tanouye, U.S. Companies Targeted in Protest
of Abortion Pill, Wall St. J., July 8, 1994, at B3.
83New Drug Application, supra note 75.
84However, an alternative drug treatment became available in New York. Dr. Richard Hausknecht, an obstetrician at the
Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York and abortion rights crusader, had performed 126 abortions by using two drugs
that were already on the market, though approved for other purposes. See John Tierney, A Lone Doctor Adapts Drugs For
Abortions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1994, at A1. Although neither drug had been approved by the FDA for use in abortions, once
a drug is on the market for other purposes, physicians have discretion to use it for o-label purposes. Under Dr. Hausknecht's
pregnancy termination regimen, the woman could be no more than eight weeks pregnant. At her rst visit, the patient received
an injection of methotrexate, a drug that inhibits tissue growth and has been used for many years to treat cancer tumors,
psoriasis, arthritis, and ectopic pregnancies. See id. Four days later, the woman returned for tablets of misoprostol to be
inserted into the vagina. The patient then went home and usually expelled the fertilized egg or fetus within three days. Dr.
Hausknecht stated that 121 of his procedures had been successful, while ve required surgery to complete the procedure. See
id. A few years after Dr. Hausknecht's experiment, Planned Parenthood of New York obtained FDA approval to begin a
nationwide clinical trial of the methotrexate-misoprostol combination to gain on-label approval of methotrexate for use as an
abortifacient. See Planned Parenthood to Test Nonsurgical Method for Abortions, Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1996, at B10.
19November 1994, however, following the political realignment of Congress, it appeared that RU-486 might be
stopped dead in its tracks even before the approval process ever got underway. Eighty-four freshmen GOP
members, 68 of whom described themselves as staunchly pro-life, joined the ranks of Congress. In the House
of Representatives, abortion opponents outnumbered supporters by a margin of 225 to 162. The Senate
was equally divided between abortion supporters and opponents, perhaps with a slight margin in favor of
abortion opponents.85 Hoping to redene government's role, the new conservative members of Congress and
their veteran conservative counterparts made a \Contract With America" to reduce the role of government
in American life. In keeping with this promise to shrink the size and role of the federal government, Newt
Gingrich, the new Speaker of the House of Representatives, called for a total restructuring of the FDA, which
conservatives had denounced as a symbol of regulatory excess that needed to be shrunk down to size. The
House of Representatives also instituted a moratorium on new regulations that would stay in eect until
Congress had a chance to revise or repeal the statutes under which the regulations were promulgated.86 This
had the eect of stopping the FDA from moving forward with many of its initiatives.
Furthermore, to uphold its \Contract With America," the new conservative movement in Congress, including
then House Commerce Committee Chairman, Thomas Bliley of Virginia, sought to ease regulatory restric-
tions on businesses. As the Republican members of Congress were pursuing these initiatives, however, more
than a dozen of them, including Representative Bliley, also signed an Americans United for Life petition,
calling upon the FDA to apply the most stringent standards in reviewing RU-486, once an NDA was submit-
ted by the Population Council, and urging the FDA not to accept data from foreign clinical studies.87 While
85See Jennifer Lenhart, Poor Timing: Abortion Pill RU-486 Starts U.S. Tests Just as Conservatives Capture Congress,
Houston Chron., Dec. 13, 1994, at 1.
86See John Schwartz, Conservative Foes of Government Regulation Focus on the FDA, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1995, at A7.
While the House passed the moratorium in the Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 24,
1995), in 141 Cong. Rec. H2209-10 (Feb. 24, 1995), the Senate passed a much more scaled back version in S. 219, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Mar. 16, 1995). See Timothy Noah, Senate to Consider Less Sweeping Bill on Regulatory Moratorium Than House,
Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1995, at A2.
87See American Political Network, Spotlight Story, Story RU-486: Group Files Petition To Block Fast-Track Approval, 6
Abortion Rep. No. 149, Mar. 1, 1995, available in WL APN-AB File.
20conservatives sought to eliminate many regulatory restrictions on businesses, their politics on abortion pre-
vented them from pursuing the same agenda with respect to RU-486, which in turn, critics charged exhibited
the inconsistency and politicization of Republican regulatory policy. These obviously conicting initiatives
to, on the one hand, erect regulatory restrictions on the RU-486 approval process, and to, on the other
hand, ease regulatory burdens on businesses, demonstrated that the politics of abortion was experiencing a
head-on collision with the \Contract With America."
B. Conservative Congressional Legislation
By June 1995, over a dozen abortion-related bills were pending in Congress, signaling that the political pen-
dulum was swinging back in favor of the anti-abortion movement. For example, under consideration were
bills to reinstate a ban on abortions at American military hospitals overseas, ban and criminalize partial-
birth abortion, repeal or modify Title X of the Public Health Service Act (which provided abortion-related
services to low-income women), and curtail federal funds to family planning programs that provide abortions
with private money.88 Congress also considered measures to lift a ban against the use of foreign aid money
for abortion counseling, limit the use of federal Medicaid money for abortions to only those cases where the
pregnancy threatened the life of the mother, end Medicaid nancing of abortions in the case of pregnancies
that result from rape or incest, and discontinue fetal tissue research.89 The intensity of the anti-abortion
sentiment within congressional ranks was further evidenced by measures to prohibit abortion counseling at
federally funded family planning clinics, restore the ban on the use of federal money for abortions in federal
prisons, prohibit the District of Columbia from using tax revenue to fund abortions, prohibit insurance cov-
erage for abortion of federal employees, and end clinical testing of RU-486.
88See Nadine Strossen, Women's Rights Under Siege, 73 N.D. L. Rev. 207, 226-27 (1997).
89See id.
21Although congressional Republicans engaged in these eorts, with House Democrats vigorously opposing
these measures and with a Democrat in the White House, the Republicans were mostly unsuccessful in eec-
tuating any change in domestic abortion policy.90 On March 14, 1996, after years of political maneuvering
and in spite of the continued polarizing debate between the combatants on both sides of the abortion issue,
the FDA approval process ocially began when the Population Council submitted an NDA to the FDA un-
der section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. x 505(b) (1999), for the approval
of RU-486.91
V. THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS GETS UNDERWAY
A. Background on the Evolution of the FDA Approval Process
Passed in 1906, the Food and Drugs Act established standards of purity and labeling requirements for drugs.92
In 1937, however, due to minimal requirements and lack of enforcement of the purity and labeling standards,
100 children died from an untested toxic liquid sulfa drug, Elixir of Sulfanilamide.93 This tragedy caused
the repeal of the Food and Drugs Act and the enactment in 1938 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.94 This new Act established requirements for any drug proposed for sale in interstate commerce. To
secure FDA approval, the Act required that in an NDA the manufacturer describe the uses of the new drug
and prove that the drug was safe for its intended uses.95 Although the Act did not contain a specic ecacy
90See Jill Zuckman, GOP Bill Targets Rare, Late-Term Type of Abortion, Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 1995, at A12.
91On March 31, 1996, the Population Council transferred the exclusive legal right to organize the manufacture and distribution
of the pill in the United States to a newly formed private company called Advances in Health Technology. See Tamar Levin,
FDA Approval Sought for French Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1996, at A12.
92Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (codied at 21 U.S.C. xx 1-15 (1934)) (repealed in 1938 by
21 U.S.C. x 392(a)); see also Richards, supra note 3, at 121.
93See Richards, supra note 3, at 121.
94Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codied as amended at 21 U.S.C. xx
301-92 (1994)); see also Muhl, supra note 4, at 331.
95See Muhl, supra note 4, at 331.
22requirement, the FDA nevertheless considered the ecacy of a drug when the drug was known to have
serious side eects or was used to treat life-threatening illnesses.96 Under the statute, the FDA had to grant
automatic approval to the application within 60 days, unless the drug had not been proven to be suciently
safe.97 In 1962, Congress amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to eliminate the 60-day automatic
approval requirement and to add a specic ecacy requirement.98
The rst step in the modern FDA drug approval process requires a drug's sponsor to submit an IND which
contains information on the uses of the drug, its pharmacological and toxicological eects based on animal
toxicity studies, and a plan for the clinical phases of human testing.99 If the FDA approves the IND
application, several phases of human testing may begin.100 Phase One testing is conducted on patients
or healthy volunteers and is used to establish the metabolism of the drug to determine an optimal dosage
level. Phase One testing also assesses the eects of the drug on the human body, its side eects, and its
eectiveness for its intended uses.101 Phase Two testing involves controlled clinical studies to evaluate the
drug's eectiveness in patients with the disease or condition for which the drug is indicated.102 Finally,
Phase Three testing consists of expanded controlled and uncontrolled studies designed to gather additional
safety and ecacy data.103
Assuming the drug performs satisfactorily during the clinical phase, the sponsor may then submit an NDA
to the FDA, requesting approval to market the drug based on the results of clinical testing. In addition to
the results of the clinical tests, the NDA must contain information about the drug's composition, toxicology,
96See Richards, supra note 3, at 122.
97See Muhl, supra note 4, at 331.
98Act of October 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962); see 21 U.S.C. x 408 and accompanying regulations. A
new drug must also undergo a series of tests and trials to prove that the drug is safe and accomplishes what it claims. See 21
U.S.C x 355 (1992); see also Muhl, supra note 4, at 331.
99See Richards, supra note 3, at 122.
100See Hanson, supra note 6, at 172.
101See Hanson, supra note 6, at 172; Muhl, supra note 4, at 333.
102See Richards, supra note 3, at 122.
103See Hanson, supra note 6, at 172.
23manufacturing, processing, packaging, and behavior in the human body.104 Once the NDA is led, the FDA
determines its review priority based on the drug's chemical composition and its potential benets. In other
words, if the drug features an active ingredient never before marketed in the United States or, if it represents
an important therapeutic gain over existing drugs on the market, the FDA can grant the drug the highest
priority review, which means that the approval process will be expedited.105 In some cases, if foreign clinical
tests have already been completed and if those tests have generated ample data, the long approval process can
also be somewhat circumvented. When, in the FDA's judgment, a foreign clinical study was well-designed
and conducted in accordance with ethical principles, the FDA will accept the foreign data in support of an
NDA.106 Once the NDA has been submitted, the FDA must, within 60 days, decide whether or not to le the
application.107 If the FDA les the application, it then conducts its own clinical, pharmacology, toxicology,
chemistry, manufacturing, statistical, biopharmaceutics, and pharmacokinetics reviews.108 In the end, the
standards that must be satised in order to secure FDA approval of a new drug are safety for its indicated
use and substantial evidence of ecacy.109
B. The Results of RU-486's French Clinical Trial
1. The Methodology and Procedures of the French Clinical Trial
The French clinical trials of RU-486, upon which most of the Population Council's NDA was based, con-
104See Hanson, supra note 6, at 172.
105See Richards, supra note 3, at 122.
106See Muhl, supra note 4, at 334.
107New Drug Application, supra note 75.
108New Drug Application, supra note 75.
109See 21 U.S.C. x355(d) (1994) (setting ecacy standards); see also 21 C.F.R. xx 312.20-212.130 (1999); Sarah Ricks, The
New French Abortion Pill: The Moral Property of Women, 75 Yale J. L. & Feminism 75, 77 (1989).
24sisted of two multicenter (24 centers) studies.110 Study One contained 1,286 women, 1,089 of whom had a
gestational duration of 49 days or less calculated from the date of the rst day of the woman's last menstrual
period.111 Study Two included 1,194 women, 492 of whom had a duration of gestation of 49 days or less
and 702 of whom had a duration of gestation of 50 days or more.112 The rst French study excluded women
over the age of 35, while the second French study excluded women over the age of 35 who smoked more than
ten cigarettes a day, had cardiovascular disease, asthma, diabetes, glaucoma or high intraocular pressure,
hyperlipidemia, or a history of renal, adrenal, or hepatic insuciency.113 The second French clinical trial also
excluded women who had been treated with corticosteroids during the previous six months, were anemic,
were using anticoagulants, had a hemostatic abnormality, or lived more than one hour away from the clinic
where they would receive treatment.114
In both studies, the treatment protocol involved the ingestation of 600 milligrams of mifepristone in the form
of three 200-milligram tablets during the rst visit.115 During the second visit, the participants received a
400-microgram dose of misoprostol and then remained in the clinic for observation for approximately four
hours.116 In Study Two, those women who had not had a medical termination within three hours of the
110Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, Application Number 20-687: Statistical Review(s) (Feb. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Statistical Review].
111New Drug Application, supra note 75.
112See id.
113See id.
114See id.
115See id.
116See id. Misoprostol is not the only oral prostaglandin which has been used in clinical studies of the RU-486 treatment
regimen. In fact, there have been three types of prostaglandins which have been used. First, studies have been conducted
using sulprostone, a PGE2, which stands for prostaglandin E of the 2 series, analogue, which is an expensive preparation, given
parenterally, and requiring refrigeration. See id. Second, studies have used gemeprost, a PGE1, which stands for prostaglandin
E of the 1 series, analogue, which is an expensive compound, given as a vaginal suppository, and requiring refrigeration. See
id. Third and most commonly, studies have employed misoprostol, also a PGE1 analogue, which is administered orally, does
not require refrigeration, and is relatively inexpensive. See id. In studies involving the use of sulprostone, the success rate for
medical abortion was 95.7%. Similarly, in studies involving gemeprost, the success rate was 95.5%. See id. Success in these
studies, or the primary ecacy parameter, was the proportion of patients who experienced a complete expulsion without the
need for surgical intervention. See id. In 1 out of 20,000 women, however, the use of sulprostone was associated with adverse
carotid eects. As a result, the use of sulprostone as a prostaglandin analogue has been discontinued, leaving gemeprost and
particularly misoprostol as the most commonly used prostaglandins. See id. Both the French and the U.S. clinical trials used
the mifepristone-misoprostol combination.
25administration of misoprostol were given an additional 200 micrograms of misoprostol and were required to
remain in the clinic for an additional two hours of observation.117 At the end of two weeks, the women in
both studies returned for an assessment of their pregnancy status. The percentage of women who had a
medical termination of pregnancy within three hours in both groups was 36%.118 Among the women with
a duration of gestation of 49 days or less, there was complete medical termination of pregnancy in 95.5%
percent of them.119 1.3% of these women had a continuing pregnancy which was then terminated by a
dilatation and curettage or a vacuum aspiration, 2.9% of them had an incomplete abortion, and 0.3% of
them required dilatation and curettage or vacuum aspiration to stop excessive bleeding.120 The results of the
clinical studies indicated that there is a statistically signicant inverse relationship between success rate and
gestational age and between success rate and the chronological age of the patient.121 For instance, while the
predicted probability of complete medical termination in a woman of 35 days duration of pregnancy is 97%,
it is only 92% for a woman with a duration of gestation of 49 days.122 Moreover, a 19-year-old woman at 49
days duration has a 97% predictive probability of complete termination of pregnancy, whereas her 35-year-old
counterpart at the same gestational age has a 92% predictive probability of complete termination.123
2. Adverse Reactions Found in French Clinical Trial
In spite of the seeming simplicity of the procedure, which involves swallowing a series of pills and returning
to a clinic or doctor's oce for follow-up care, many adverse events were found to accompany the RU-486
117See id.
118See id.
119See id
120See id.
121Statistical Review, supra note 110..
122New Drug Application, supra note 75.
123See id.
26treatment regimen. For example, the most commonly recorded adverse event during the French clinical
trial was painful uterine contractions, occurring in 82% of the patients.124 Nausea occurred in 45% of the
patients, vomiting in 20%, diarrhea in 15%, headaches in 3%, fainting, dizziness, and metrorrhagia (an
abnormal hemorrhage of the uterus) in 2%, anemia, asthenia (loss or lack of bodily strength), chills, and
fever in 1%, hot ashes in slightly more than 0.5%, and skin conditions, anxiety, and breast conditions such as
itching and discharge in less than 0.5%.125 Much less commonly, the study subjects experienced palpitations
(5 patients), tachycardia (excessively rapid heartbeat in 5 patients), hypotension (7 patients), syncope (brief
loss of consciousness caused by transient anemia in 2 patients), and thoracic pain (1 patient).126 Furthermore,
21 women out of the 2,480 clinical study population had a severe bleeding episode.127 Two of those women
received surgical intervention to stop the bleeding, and four received transfusions.128 Finally, the mean
duration of bleeding as a result of the treatment regimen was 9.1 days, with the longest duration of bleeding
being 69 days.
3. Summary of French Study's Findings
In summary, 2,480 subjects enrolled in the two French studies. Study One, which included mostly women
with a pregnancy duration of no more than 49 days, had an overall success rate of 95.5%. Study Two, which
included women with a pregnancy duration up to 63 days, had an overall success rate of 92.8%.
4. Results of Animal Testing
124See id.
125See id.
126See id.
127See id.
128See id.
27In addition to the human phase of clinical testing, tests were run on laboratory animals to assess the eects
of RU-486 on dierent organ systems. In general, there were either no or mild eects in the nervous,
cardiovascular, respiratory, and gastrointestinal systems.129 The genitourinary studies, however, revealed a
decreased excretion of sodium and potassium in some of the laboratory animals after the administration of
the drug.130 In addition, the animal toxicity studies indicated that a dose of 1,000 milligrams per kilogram
of mifepristone caused some toxicity in the rodents in the form of ambulatory diculties and distension of
the stomach.131
Out of a concern that the use of RU-486 could cause future fertility diculties in women who have used the
drug or could cause birth defects in children who are born after the unsuccessful completion of the treatment
regimen, reproductive toxicology studies were conducted on the laboratory animals to assess the eects of
RU-486 on the reproductive system. In one study, rats received two doses of the drug, up to three milligrams
per kilogram each, which resulted in the disruption of the estrous cycles of these rats during the course of
a 21-day treatment.132 After the drug was withdrawn, the rats gradually resumed their estrous cycles.133
When they later mated with normal males, gestation, parturition, litter size, and the morphology, body
weight, and survival rate of the ospring were not aected by the treatment, leading to the conclusion that
RU-486 does not negatively aect fertility.134 Additionally, to assess the potential for birth defects after the
administration of RU-486, mice, rats, and rabbits received a dose of the drug at the time of implantation
and at various other points during their pregnancies.135 These tests indicated that there were no teratogenic
eects in the animals. Finally, the animal genetic toxicology studies demonstrated that mifepristone does
not cause mutations or chromosomal aberrations.136
129See id.
130See id.
131See id.
132See id.
133See id.
134See id.
135See id.
136See id.
28C. The Results of the U.S. Clinical Trial
1. The Methodology and Procedures of U.S. Clinical Trials
From September 13, 1994 to September 12, 1995, the ecacy and safety of mifepristone were evaluated in
two multicenter studies in the United States according to two identical protocols at 17 centers in 15 states.137
Only centers that could perform abortions either by vacuum aspiration or dilatation and curettage and had
ready access to facilities that provided blood transfusions and performed emergency resuscitation procedures
were allowed to serve as treatment sites.138 The participants were divided into three groups according to
gestational age. The rst group contained patients with a gestation of 49 days or less; the second group
consisted of patients with a gestation of 50-56 days; and the third group contained patients with a gestation
of 57-63 days.139 A total of 2,121 women enrolled in the study, with 859 patients in the rst group, 722
patients in the second group, and 540 patients in the third group.140 Most of the participants were Caucasian
(71%), 20-29 years of age (61%) with a mean age of 26.9 years, of normal body mass index (71%), nulliparous
(55%), and had a previous elective abortion (51%).141
To be considered for inclusion in the U.S. clinical trial, a woman had to be at least 18 years of age and needed
to meet some minimum health requirements. In addition, each participant had to request a voluntary ter-
mination of pregnancy, had to have a positive urine pregnancy test and an intrauterine pregnancy with a
137Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, Application Number: 20-687, Medical Review(s), Medical Ocer's Review of Amendments 024
and 033 [hereinafter Review of Amendments]. Because the data gathered from the U.S. clinical trial was still being audited at
the time of the submission of the Population Council's NDA, the results of the French trial formed the basis of the Council's
NDA. Nevertheless, the U.S. clinical trial was necessary in order to assess how the regimen would operate within the American
health care system and to assure that the results of the French trials were not haphazard or unreliable.
138Review of Amendments, supra note 137.
139Id.
140Id. The treatment regimen was the same as in France. It consisted of the administration of 600 milligrams of mifepristone
followed two days later by 400 micrograms of misoprostol. Clinical observation for four hours followed misoprostol adminis-
tration. The participant returned to the site approximately two weeks later to conrm pregnancy termination. See Beverly
Winiko, et al., Acceptability and Feasibility of Early Pregnancy Termination by Mifepristone-Misoprostol: Results of a Large
Multicenter Trial in the United States, 7 Archives of Fam. Med. 360 (1998).
141See Review of Amendments, supra note 137.
29duration of gestation of 63 days or less that was conrmed by uterine size on a pelvic examination and by
a vaginal ultrasound evaluation, and had to agree to undergo surgical intervention if the study procedures
failed to terminate her pregnancy. Finally, the study only included U.S. residents who had proered informed
written consent to a supervising physician.142
On the other hand, exclusion criteria included the existence of any disorder which represented a contraindi-
cation to the use of mifepristone or misoprostol, a history of severe liver disease, respiratory problems, renal
disease, thromboembolism, cardiovascular disease, chronic hypertension, anemia, clotting defects, or pelvic
inammatory disease.143 Women who had an intrauterine device in situ, were breastfeeding, or had an
ectopic pregnancy were also excluded.144 Furthermore, women who were unlikely to understand or comply
with the requirements of the study or who lived more than one hour from the emergency care facility which
provided surgical or resuscitation procedures for the abortion center were not allowed to participate in the
trial.145 Lastly, any woman who was over 35 years old and smoked more than 10 cigarettes a day, and who
had additional risk factors for cardiovascular disease such as diabetes or hyperlipidemia could not participate
in the U.S. clinical trial.146
2. Adverse Reactions Found in U.S. Clinical Trial
The results of the U.S. trial were similar to the results of the French clinical trial. Overall, a total of 259
patients, out of the 2,121 patient population, had failed medical abortions. Of these failed abortions, 79 (27%)
had ongoing pregnancies, 126 (43%) had incomplete abortions, 30 (10%) requested surgical terminations,
142See id.
143See id.
144See id
145See id.
146See id.
30and 60 (20%) had surgical terminations because of medical indications related to the medical procedure.147
As in the French clinical trial, many adverse episodes were found to accompany the RU-486 treatment
regimen. 99% of the patients in each gestational cohort reported adverse events, and most patients reported
even more than one adverse event.148 While 23% of the adverse events were judged to be severe, the majority
of such events were of mild or moderate severity.149 The most commonly reported adverse episodes were
abdominal pain and uterine cramping followed by nausea, vomiting, headache, dizziness, and diarrhea.150
Additionally, the rst, second, and third cohorts experienced median bleeding durations of 14 days, 15 days,
and 15 days respectively, which were considerably longer than the bleeding durations found in the French
clinical trial.151 Although there were no deaths, 14 (0.7%) patients were hospitalized for an adverse event.152
In particular, of these 14 patients, two of four from the 49 gestational days or less group, three of ve from
the 50-56 gestational days group, and three of ve from the 57-63 gestational days group endured a drug-
related adverse event, most commonly excessive bleeding.153 The remaining six patients were hospitalized for
reasons unrelated to the treatment regimen such as pneumonia, meningitis, automobile accident, depression,
shooting injury, and endometritis.154 Nineteen patients (0.9%) had emergency room visits that did not
result in hospitalization. Of those 19 patients, 16 experienced excessive bleeding (two from the 49 days or
less group, seven from the 50-56 days group, and seven from the 57-63 days group), while the other three
had chest pain, nausea and vomiting, and cramping.155
Moreover, four patients received blood transfusions (one from the 49 gestational days or less group, two
from the 50-56 gestational days group, and one from the 57-63 gestational days group). IV uids were
147See id.
148See id.
149See id.
150See id.
151See id.
152See id.
153See id.
154See id.
155See id.
31administered to nine patients in the 49 days or less group, 19 patients in the 50-56 days group, and 18
patients in the 57-63 days group.156 The proportion of patients with a decrease in hemoglobin or hematocrit
of more than 20% from their pre-mifepristone levels increased signicantly with gestational age, from 3.1%
in the 49 gestational days or less cohort to 8% in the 57-63 gestational days cohort.157 Hypotension after
mifepristone administration occurred in 0.3% - 1.4% of the treatment population, and hypertension after
mifepristone administration occurred in 1.5% - 1.7% of all treated patients.158 Finally, 18.2% - 21.3% of all
patients experienced a decrease in heart rate by over 20% after the administration of misoprostol, while, on
the other hand, 11.8% - 14.1% of all patients experienced an increase in heart rate by over 20% after the
administration of misoprostol.159
Even in light of all of these recorded adverse episodes, the Population Council determined, based on an
acceptability and feasibility study it had conducted, that the treatment regimen of oral mifepristone and
misoprostol was both acceptable to women and health care providers in the United States and feasible for
continued clinical practice. Nearly all of the participants in the U.S. clinical trial (95.7%) recommended the
procedure to others, 91.2% claimed they would choose it again, and 87.6% considered the procedure either
very or moderately satisfactory.160 Surprisingly, even among those women for whom the method had failed,
69.6% said they would try it again, 84.9% would recommend it to others, and 51.9% considered it either
very or moderately satisfactory.161 The Population Council's acceptability and feasibility study found that
the most commonly cited positive attributes of the RU-486 treatment regimen were the lack of surgery, the
156See id.
157See id.
158See id.
159See id.
160See Beverly Winiko, et al., Acceptability and Feasibility of Early Pregnancy Termination by Mifepristone-Misoprostol:
Results of a Large Multicenter Trial in the United States, 7 Archives of Fam. Med. 360 (1998).
161See Beverly Winiko, et al., Acceptability and Feasibility of Early Pregnancy Termination by Mifepristone-Misoprostol:
Results of a Large Multicenter Trial in the United States, 7 Archives of Fam. Med. 360 (1998).
32noninvasiveness of the procedure, and its simplicity.162 On the other hand, the most commonly cited worst
features related to the fear of side eects and uncertainty over the newness of the procedure.163 Overall,
two-thirds of the patient population expressed that the experience was better than expected.164 On the
feasibility front, the study data suggested that a signicant proportion of women found it cumbersome to
manage the three visits required by the trial regimen, citing professional obligations, child care needs, and
transportation.165 As a result of the cumbersome nature of the treatment regimen, these women and some
health care providers endorsed the feasibility of home administration of mifepristone and misoprostol.166
D. RU-486 Receives Conditional Approval
On July 19, 1996, only four months after the Population Council's submission of its NDA, the Reproductive
Health Drugs Advisory Committee of the FDA assembled at the FDA's Technical Center in Gaithersburg,
Maryland to examine the safety and ecacy data presented by the Population Council and to advise the
FDA on whether to approve RU-486 for use as an abortifacient.167 In keeping with the continuous twists
and turns of RU-486's saga, the Advisory Committee's meeting presented yet another illustration of RU-
486's eventful path toward approval. Given the controversial nature of the subject at issue and the passion
that animated both sides of the abortion debate, the FDA took unusual security precautions for its all-day
meeting. Based on the extraordinary security measures taken by the FDA, the meeting could have been
mistaken for an unveiling of CIA secrets. For example, uniformed police ocers patrolled the entrances to
162See Press Release, Population Council, Early Medical Abortion with Mifepristone and Misoprostol Is Highly Ac-
ceptable to American Women and Feasible Within the U.S. Health Care System (July 14, 1998), available at
http://www.popcouncil.org/news views/earlymed.html.
163See id.
164See id.
165See id.
166See id.
167See Gina Kolata, Abortion Pill Reaches New U.S. Juncture, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1996 at A10. The FDA chose to begin
its review process so soon after the submission of the NDA because it had classied the application as a priority application on
the grounds that it was the rst drug proposed for its indication. See New Drug Application, supra note 75. Under the goals
delineated in the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992) (codied as amended at
21 U.S.C. xx 379g-h (1994 & Supp. III 1997)), the FDA is to act on priority applications within six months.
33the FDA's Technical Center; attendees assembled at a motel in Washington, D.C. and were surreptitiously
transported to the meeting site by special vans;168 and upon arriving at the meeting, participants had to
pass a blockade of local and federal police before being ushered in through metal detectors. As the attendees
quickly ltered into the meeting, a small assembly of people protested outside the building but were kept
away from the meeting and the participants by a security blockade.169 In a letter dated before the date
of the Advisory Committee meeting, members of pro-life groups criticized the Clinton Administration for
politicizing the drug approval process and called upon Dr. Kessler to recuse himself from the proceedings of
the Advisory Committee meeting on the grounds that his proactive eorts with the Clinton Administration
to bring the drug to the American market had created impermissible conicts of interest.170
Even in the face of all of this controversy and drama, the meeting went forward as planned. By a vote of 6 to 2,
the Committee ruled that the French data indicated the ecacy of the RU-486 regimen in terminating early
pregnancy.171 A unanimous Committee, however, did express reservations about nal ecacy questions
in the current absence of nal audited U.S. data and recommended that the FDA review the U.S. data
when completed to assess if it was consistent with the French clinical data.172 With seven in favor and
one abstention, the Committee also found that the French data and the preliminary U.S. data adequately
demonstrated the safety of the regimen for use in the United States under its proposed indication.173 Taking
into consideration the overall safety and ecacy data, in a 6-0 vote with two abstentions, the Committee
further determined that the French studies revealed that the benets of a mifepristone and misoprostol
regimen outweighed its risks.174 The Committee then reserved the right to reexamine the data if information
from the U.S. clinical trial contradicted the French data.175
168See RU-486: FDA Receives Some Good Advice, Star-Tribune (Minneapolis-St. Paul), July 24, 1996, at 12A.
169See Sheryl Stolberg, FDA Panel Calls for OK of Abortion Pill, L.A. Times, July 20, 1996, at A1.
170See Cal Thomas, The Silver Bullet of Abortion, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, July 23, 1996, at 11.
171See New Drug Application, supra note 75.
172See id.
173See id.
174See Review of Amendments, supra note 137.
175See Gina Kolata, Panel Advises FDA to Allow Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1996, at A1.
34Two months after the Advisory Committee meeting, and after a then seven-year battle to introduce RU-486
into the United States, the FDA granted conditional approval to RU-486 on September 18, 1996. However,
the FDA did subject the Population Council to the following Phase Four commitments: (1) to monitor
the adequacy of the drug's distribution and credentialing system; (2) to follow up on the outcome of a
representative sample of mifepristone-treated women who have surgical abortions after method failure; (3)
to evaluate the long-term eects of multiple uses of the treatment regimen; (4) to assess whether women
adhere to the complete regimen; (5) to study the safety and ecacy of the drug in women under the age of
18, women over the age of 35, and women who smoke; and (6) to ascertain the eect of the drug on children
born after the RU-486 treatment had failed and the pregnancy had not been terminated by methods of
surgical intervention.176 Furthermore, in its approvable letter, the FDA requested additional information on
the drug's labeling and manufacturing processes.177
VI. ON THE CUSP OF APPROVAL: THE ABORTION PILL'S
UNITED STATES DEBUT IS POSTPONED
A.
Lawsuits Prevent RU-486 From Reaching the Consumer Market
176Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, Application Number 20-687: Approval Letter (Sept. 18, 1996).
177See Gina Kolata, Pill for Abortion Clears Big Hurdle To Its Sale In U.S., N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1996, at A1. The
announcement by the Population Council that it had secured conditional FDA approval not surprisingly came on the eve of a
hotly contested abortion vote in the House of Representatives. The Population Council was attempting to declare victory over
its anti-abortion opponents and to signal to these opponents that any anti-abortion legislative activity on the horizon could
not encumber RU-486's imminent entry into the United States, especially in light of its recent receipt of conditional approval
from the FDA. The House vote the following day involved the legalization of a form of late-term abortion called partial-birth
abortion, which had been outlawed by Congress in the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 1995, H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. (1995); S.
939, 104th Cong. (1995). Having been vetoed by President Clinton, the House voted to override the veto 285-137. See Gina
Kolata, Pill for Abortion Clears Big Hurdle To Its Sale In U.S., N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1996, at A1. Anti-abortion forces were
stung, however, when the Senate voted to sustain President Clinton's veto. Despite subsequent congressional attempts, the
partial-birth abortion ban has not been enacted into law.
35For a brief moment, the RU-486 approval process was running smoothly. After the Population Council had
secured conditional approval from the FDA, it appeared that the French abortion pill would soon debut on
the U.S. pharmaceutical market. Of course, RU-486's brief moment of calm would not last for long. Indeed,
its attainment of conditional FDA approval was the period of calm before the storm. Soon after winning
conditional approval, the story of RU-486 took another interesting turn, which ensnared it in the most con-
troversy it had seen to date and served to snag its trajectory toward the U.S. pharmaceutical market.
By way of background to this controversy, the Population Council had licensed another nonprot orga-
nization, Advances in Health Technology, see supra note 91, to manufacture and distribute RU-486 in the
United States.178 Advances in Health Technology subsequently sub-licensed the manufacturing and distribu-
tion rights to NeoGen Industries, a corporation controlled by a lawyer and businessman named Joseph Pike.
Pike had earlier worked with the Population Council on the development of an intrauterine contraceptive
device.179 In an eort to raise money from investors to nance the RU-486 project, Pike established a series
of limited partnerships and some other companies that were incorporated in the Cayman Islands.180 One
investor, the Giant Group of Beverly Hills, paid $6 million to Pike for a 26% interest in Pike's companies and
allegedly secured as part of the agreement a restrictive covenant that barred Pike from selling a signicant
portion of his entities to other prospective investors.181 When Pike allegedly violated this agreement by
attempting to sell a substantial share of his entities to various other purchasers, the Giant Group led suit in
Los Angeles Superior Court, accusing Pike of fraud, breach of duciary duty, fraudulent concealment, breach
of contract, and unfair business practices.182 In keeping with RU-486's fascinating and controversial odyssey
was the lawsuit's further contention that Mr. Pike was a disbarred lawyer who had been convicted of forgery
178See Editorial, The Troubles of RU-486, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1996, at A32.
179See Tamar Lewin, Abortion Pill's Legal Woe May Be Nearing an End, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1997, at A7.
180See Gina Kolata, Business Dispute May Delay Introduction of Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1996, at A20. The
Cayman Islands entities were not required to disclose the names of ocers and partners. See id.
181See id.
182See id.
36in North Carolina and, as a result, received a suspended two-year sentence and 18 months probation.183
Information about Pike's alleged notorious dealings and shady past soon ignited a urry of lawsuits against
him that hindered RU-486's entry into the U.S. consumer market. KCC Delaware, one of the investors in
Pike's entities, sued Pike and accused him of concealing his past and mishandling the investment deal.184
In a separate suit led on November 4, 1996 in New York State Supreme Court, the Population Council
and Advances in Health Technology charged Pike with fraud.185 The lawsuit alleged that Pike had not
properly accounted for the money that was invested in his entities and had ciphoned o money into some
dubious o-shore entities.186 While the Population Council and Advances in Health Technology did not seek
to rescind the sublicenses Pike had issued to Danco Laboratories and other companies to manufacture and
distribute the drug, they did seek to wrest control of the company from him by having his interest in the
entities transferred to a court-appointed receiver.187 The Population Council strongly believed that Pike's
past legal troubles and his eorts to conceal them disqualied him from serving as a duciary and the lead
business entrepreneur in the RU-486 enterprise { a politically sensitive and controversial venture that needed
a person of irrefutable integrity at its helm.
After months of legal jostling, the stalemate nally came to an end on February 12, 1997 when the Population
Council announced that it had settled the lawsuit surrounding control of RU-486 and had arranged for a
new privately held company, Advances for Choice, to handle the drug.188 Under the settlement, Pike agreed
to sell most of his equity interest in the RU-486 enterprise, keeping only a modest passive investment, and to
183See id.
184See Sharon Bernstein, Persistence Brought Abortion Pill to U.S.: Two Feminist Activists Culled Nonprot Organizations
and Dedicated Individuals To Do The Work That No Pharmaceutical Company Was Willing to Tackle, L.A Times, Nov. 5,
2000, at A1.
185See Tamar Lewin, Dispute May Delay Abortion in the U.S., N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1996, at A16
186See id.
187See Caryle Murphy & Kathleen Day, Abortion Pill's U.S. Debut Snagged by Business Dispute: Sponsor Seeks to Oust
Associate For Not Disclosing Disbarment, Wash. Post., Jan. 12, 1997, at A1.
188See Tamar Lewin, Legal Bout Over Abortion Pill Ends: Group Will Apply For FDA Approval, L.A. Daily News, Feb. 13,
1997, at N19. The Population Council had previously intended to distribute RU-486 through Advances for Health Technology,
which was subsumed into the new company. See FDC Reports, Mifepristone (RU-486) Distribution Given to a New Company
Headed by Former Generic Exec Van Hulst, The Pink Sheet, Feb. 17, 1997.
37relinquish any role in the management of the newly formed company.189 Jack Van Hulst, a Dutch attorney
and Population Council consultant, became the president and chief executive of Advances for Choice and
forecasted that the drug would be available to doctors and clinics by December 1997.190
B.
More Lawsuits { This Time Involving the Manufacture of the Drug
189American Political Network, Spotlight Story, Story RU-486: Suit Settled; Sales May Begin in '97, 7 Abortion Rep. No.
137, Feb. 13, 1997, available in WL APN-AB File.
190See Tamar Lewin, Legal Hurdle Cleared in Sale of French Abortion Pill in U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1997, at A28.
38Predictably, Mr. Van Hulst's prediction did not come to fruition as yet another twist in the
long and convoluted battle to bring the French abortion pill to the U.S. market arose. Just two
weeks after the smoke had cleared in the Pike conagration, the Population Council's European
manufacturer, Budapest-based Chemical Works of Gedeon Richter, Ltd., announced that it
was terminating its ve-year bulk mifepristone manufacturing agreement.191 This shocking
announcement caused Danco Laboratories Ltd., the domestic marketer and distributor of the
drug, to le suit against Gedeon Richter for breach of contract in New York State Supreme
Court in Manhattan.192 Under the manufacturing and supply agreement, Gedeon Richter had
agreed to replace Roussel-Uclaf as manufacturer and produce all of Danco's requirements for
bulk mifepristone, while an unnamed manufacturer had agreed to put mifepristone into tablet
form.193 Danco's law suit contended that Gedeon Richter's decision could be \a major and
potentially ruinous setback."194 Danco further asserted that the manufacturing delays could
jeopardize Danco's RU-486 U.S. patent rights, which were scheduled to expire on January 8,
2002, and could cause Danco to lose sales and marketing opportunities well in excess of $200
million.195
C.
191See Aaron Zitner, What Ever Happened to the Saga of RU-486?, Boston Globe, Nov. 23, 1997, (Magazine), at 18. At
approximately the same time, Roussel-Uclaf and its parent company, Hoechst, transferred without remuneration the patent
rights for RU-486 to a newly formed small company called Excelgyn, headed by former chief executive of Roussel-Uclaf, Edouard
Sakiz. See Pill for Abortion Ends Production, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1997, at D2. Roussel-Uclaf admitted that boycotts of the
company's products, particularly the boycott of Hoechst's new allergy drug, Allegra, which was expected to exceed $3 million
in sales within the next three years and be much more protable than RU-486, along with general pressure from the pro-life
movement, inuenced its decision. See American Political Network, Story, RU-486: Pharmaceutical Company Gives Up Rights,
7 Abortion Rep. No. 174, Apr. 9, 1997, available in WL APN-AB File. Roussel-Uclaf expected that Sakiz's smaller company
would be less vulnerable to consumer pressure. The transaction between the two companies did not aect the American situation
or the availability of RU-486 in the United States since Roussel-Uclaf had transferred the American rights to the drug years
earlier.
192See FDC Reports, Richter Exit From RU-486 Bulk Supply Agreement Could Jeopardize Danco Patent Rights, The Pink
Sheet, June 16, 1997.
193See id. The Population Council had submitted its NDA for RU-486 with Roussel-Uclaf as the \stand-in active substance
manufacturer" until Gedeon Richter provided the Population Council with internal stability tests and demonstrated the com-
parability of its manufacturing processes to those of Roussel-Uclaf. See id.
194See American Political Network, Health & Reproduction, Story, RU-486: Delay Seen To Be Inevitable, 7 Abortion Rep.
No. 212, June 13, 1997, available in WL APN-AB.
195See Danco Lab., Ltd. v. Chemical Works of Gedeon Richter, Ltd., 274 A.D.2d 1, 6-7, 711 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dep't 2000);
see also FDC Reports, Richter Exit From RU-486 Bulk Supply Agreement Could Jeopardize Danco Patent Rights, The Pink
Sheet, June 16, 1997. With plans to market RU-486 in the United States in complete upheaval, a New York abortion-rights
organization, Abortion Rights Mobilization, under the presidency of Lawrence Lader, began oering the drug to as many as
10,000 women in New York. See Tamar Lewin, Group Is Intensifying Its Campaign To Distribute Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times,
July 2, 1997, at A21. In 1996, Abortion Rights Mobilization had secured FDA approval to use its version of the RU-486 drug
in research trials in New York, Nebraska, Vermont, Montana, California, and Washington. See id. Although the Population
Council holds the U.S. patent rights to RU-486, others are permitted to copy patented drugs for research use so long as the
drugs are not sold commercially. See id.
39More Political Issues
For over a year, the fate of RU-486 remained uncertain; in fact, RU-486's future seemed rather
bleak. The drug's sponsors experienced colossal diculties in locating a new manufacturer
after Gedeon Richter's withdrawal. Moreover, with Republicans in the majority on Capitol
Hill, RU-486's path toward approval, already mired in a manufacturing and litigation mess,
became further quagmired. On June 25, 1998, the House of Representatives voted 223 to
202 to block the FDA from approving RU-486.196 While the House's conservative position
on the drug was unsurprising, advocates of RU-486 became concerned that RU-486 might
encounter some problems from an unexpected source. In September 1998, the White House
ocially announced the nomination of Jane Henney, M.D., a 51-year old Indiana native and
former vice president for health sciences at the University of New Mexico, as the next FDA
Commissioner.197 Not surprisingly, questions about Henney's position on RU-486 abounded
at her conrmation proceedings. In particular, congressional leaders expressed interest in
whether she would pursue the same policy activism of her predecessor. To win Senate approval,
Dr. Henney reiterated to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee that, in her prior
tenure as Deputy Commissioner for Operations, she had not actively solicited an application
for approval of RU-486. Dr. Henney's transparent, though subdued, support for the drug,
prompted some Republicans to stall her conrmation; however, in the end, as a result of her
political adroitness in dealing with such a politically potent issue, she was able to gain Senate
conrmation.198
After failing to block Dr. Henney's conrmation, some Republicans made another eort to keep RU-486
bottled up and out of the U.S. pharmaceutical market. On June 8, 1999, House Republicans, led by Rep-
resentative Tom Coburn of Oklahoma passed an amendment to the FY2000 Agriculture Appropriations bill
that barred the FDA from using government funds to approve abortifacient drugs, including mifepristone.199
Ultimately, however, this measure proved unsuccessful as the Senate approved $1.18 billion in spending for
the FDA in the Agriculture/FDA appropriations bill passed on October 13, 1999, H.R. 2684, 106th Cong.,
1st Session.200 Representative Coburn's language barring the FDA from approving RU-486 or any other
196See Katharine Q. Seelye, House Votes to Block FDA on Approval of Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1998, at A20.
197See New Commissioner, New Challenges, BioPharm, Sept. 1, 1998, at 12.
198See FDC Reports, FDA Commissioner Negotiations Focus on Non-FDA Abortion Issues, The Pink Sheet, Oct. 19, 1998.
199See Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000,
H.R. 3780-03, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Press Release, NARAL, Congress Blocks FDA Approval of RU-486 (June 8, 1999),
available at http://www.naral.org/mediaresources/press/pr060899 congress.html.
200See FDC Reports, FDA Appropriations, The Pink Sheet, Oct. 18, 1999.
40abortifacient drug was removed from the bill during conference.201
VII. READY, SET, NO GO
A. The FDA's Second Approvable Letter
By the end of 1999, Danco Laboratories, the Population Council's sublicensee responsible for the marketing
of RU-486 in the United States, announced that it had nally obtained a replacement for Gedeon Richter.
However, out of a concern for potential extremist violence, Danco chose to withhold the name of the new
manufacturer.202 On February 18, 2000, following the resolution of the manufacturing crisis, the FDA issued
another approvable letter, expressing that RU-486 would receive approval, but only pending resolution
of certain specied marketing and labeling issues.203 In particular, the approvable letter reminded the
Population Council of its Phase Four commitments, as delineated in the September 1996 approvable letter,
and expressed concern that the FDA had not received adequate information demonstrating that the drug,
when marketed in accordance with the terms of the proposed distribution system, is safe and eective for
its indicated use.204 The FDA further demanded that only abortion practitioners prescribe RU-486, that
all prescribing doctors be trained in the drug's use and in reading ultrasound scans to conrm the duration
of pregnancy, and that prescribing doctors maintain admitting privileges at an emergency care facility no
more than one hour away from their oces.205 Following receipt of this second approvable letter from the
201See id.
202See FDC Reports, Mifepristone Ancillary Trial Costs Are Being Covered By Seattle-Area Insurers, The Pink Sheet, Oct.
11, 1999.
203See FDC Reports, Mifepristone, The Pink Sheet, Feb. 21, 2000.
204February 18, 2000 Approvable Letter (FDA letter to Population Council regarding NDA 20-687).
205Similar requirements have been imposed on other drugs, including thalidomide and some narcotics used to relieve pain in
cancer patients. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, FDA Adds Hurdles in Approval of Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2000, at A21.
After learning of these new requirements, abortion advocates feared that the FDA's demands could lead to the creation of a
national registry of RU-486 providers and that such a registry, which would give abortion opponents the opportunity to single
out and potentially harass such providers, would discourage doctors from becoming abortion providers, thereby limiting access
to abortion services.
41FDA, the Population Council and Danco Laboratories promptly addressed the FDA's concerns by the end
of March 2000.206 The FDA then proceeded to set September 30, 2000 as the action date upon which a
decision on RU-486's status in the United States would nally be made.207 This action date indicated that
the Population Council's and Danco's submission in response to the February 18, 2000 approvable letter was
regarded as a \Class 2" submission requiring substantial review time, which under the Prescription Drug
User Fee Act guidelines, is usually six months.208
B. G.D. Searle Distances Itself from RU-486
As the crucial September 30, 2000 federal deadline neared, RU-486's compelling saga took another interesting
turn, which had the potential of encumbering the drug's entrance into the U.S. market altogether. Only a
month before FDA action on the pending NDA for RU-486 was expected, Pharmacia Corp.'s G.D. Searle &
Co., the manufacturer of a gastric ulcer treatment called Cytotec, the brand name for misoprostol, issued a
statement indicating that its gastric ulcer treatment was contraindicated for use in pregnant women.209 In
this statement, the company distanced itself from Cytotec's use in combination with mifepristone in early
pregnancy termination and noted that although \the uterotonic eect of Cytotec is an inherent property" of
the prostaglandin product, \Cytotec is not approved for the induction of labor or abortion."210 In a move
criticized for its partiality on the part of abortion opponents, the FDA inserted itself into the controversy by
attempting to negotiate with Searle. The FDA suggested a change to Cytotec's label to include pregnancy
termination as an indicated use of misoprostol.211 Abortion advocates, on the other hand, applauded the
206See FDC Reports, RU-486 Action Date Is September 30: Allen Named Reproductive Division Director, The Pink Sheet,
June 12, 2000.
207See id.
208See The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992) (codied as amended at 21
U.S.C. xx 379g-h (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
209See FDC Reports, Searle Cytotec Pregnancy Reminder Issued as RU-486 Action Nears, The Pink Sheet, Aug. 28, 2000.
210See id.
211See FDC Reports, Searle/FDA Cytotec Labeling Negotiations Continue Ahead of Mifeprex Launch, The Pink Sheet, Oct.
9, 2000. Outraged by the FDA's tactics, Representative Coburn contended that \a precedent has been set because we now have
the FDA asking a manufacturer to allow a drug to be used o label by their implicit approval of another two-drug combination,
when in fact the manufacturer doesn't want any part of it and doesn't want the liability associated with it." See id.
42FDA's proactive, though unsuccessful eorts in this regard, while also decrying Searle's action as a deliberate
attempt to hinder mifepristone's entrance into the U.S. pharmaceutical market.
VIII. RU-486 FINALLY DEBUTS
A. At Last, FDA Approval
On September 28, 2000, in spite of Searle's actions, and after a 12-year intense journey with numerous false
starts and stops, RU-486 nally secured FDA approval under 21 C.F.R. x 314.520 (Subpart H).212 The timing
of the FDA's approval deadline was acute: by ensuring completion of its review before the end of 2000, the
FDA avoided confronting the potentiality of a new adverse executive administration, as well as a possible
appropriations rider that would deny funding for review in scal year 2001.213
The approval letter, however, delineated several restrictions for the distribution of RU-486 in the United
States. First, under 21 C.F.R. x 314.520, RU-486 must be provided by or under the supervision of a
physician who must be qualied: (1) to assess the duration of pregnancy, leaving ultrasound evaluation to
the professional judgment of the treating physician; (2) to diagnose ectopic pregnancies; and (3) to provide
surgical intervention in situations of incomplete expulsion or excessive bleeding, or a plan to provide such
emergency care through other qualied physicians. In addition, the physician must read and understand the
provisions of the prescriber's agreement, provide each patient with a medication guide and patient agreement
form, fully explain both, and obtain the patient's signature on the patient agreement form, notify the sponsor
212FDA Approval Letter, September 28, 2000, NDA 20-687. Subpart H grants accelerated approval to certain new drugs that
have been studied for their safety and eectiveness in treating serious or life-threatening illnesses and that provide meaningful
therapeutic benets to patients over already existing treatments. Because the FDA determined that the termination of an
unwanted pregnancy is a serious condition within the scope of Subpart H and because it resolved that the meaningful therapeutic
benet over existing treatments was the avoidance of a surgical procedure, the FDA granted RU-486 approval under Subpart
H. Subpart H allows for restrictions on use or distribution if the FDA concludes that a drug shown to be eective can only be
used safely if restrictions on use or distribution are implemented. See 21 C.F.R. x 314.520 (2000). The rules grant the FDA
special authority to restrict the distribution of the newly licensed drug and delineate a procedure for quick removal from the
market should problems arise.
213See FDC Reports, Searle Cytotec Abortion Use Clears FDA { In Another Sponsor's Label, The Pink Sheet, Oct. 2, 2000.
43or its designate in writing of any instances of ongoing pregnancy which are not terminated subsequent to
the conclusion of the treatment procedure, report all hospitalizations, transfusions, or other serious events
to the sponsor or its designate, and record the drug package's serial number in each patient's record.214
Second, with respect to the aspects of distribution other than physician qualications, the FDA mandated
certain procedures for storage, dosage tracking, and damaged product returns to ensure the integrity of
the product.215 In particular, the FDA required secure manufacturing, receiving, and holding areas for the
drug, secure shipping procedures, including tamper-proof seals, controlled returns procedures, a tracking
system that can trace individual packages to a patient while maintaining patient condentiality, use of
authorized distributors and agents with the necessary expertise to handle distribution requirements, and
a direct, condential distribution system that allows only qualied physicians to receive the drug for the
purpose of patient dispensation.216
Third, as permitted under 21 CFR x 201.57(e), the FDA imposed a black box warning requirement whereby
the package would include information regarding the desirability of surgical intervention and access to these
services either through the prescriber or by referral should the treatment procedure fail.217 Fourth, some of
the Phase Four commitments that were specied in both the September 1996 and February 2000 approvable
letters were integrated into a cohort-based study of the safety outcomes of patients having medical abortion
under the care of physicians with surgical intervention skills as compared to the safety outcomes of those
patients whose physicians must refer them to other physicians for surgical procedures.218 Finally, the FDA
requested the completion of a surveillance study on the outcomes of ongoing pregnancies on children born
after the unsuccessful completion of the RU-486 treatment regimen.219
214FDA Approval Letter, September 28, 2000, NDA 20-687.
215See Memorandum, Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration,
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, September 28, 2000.
216See id.
217See 21 C.F.R. x 201.57(e)(2000).
218See Memorandum, Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration,
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, September 28, 2000.
219FDA Approval Letter, September 28, 2000, NDA 20-687. Although the FDA had expressed an interest in conducting studies
44IX. THE ABORTION PILL IS HARD TO SWALLOW
A.
The 2000 Presidential Election
As expected, the FDA's approval of RU-486 incited a \political tempest"220 with abortion rights advocates
celebrating the drug's FDA approval as the most remarkable triumph of abortion rights since Roe v. Wade.
On the other hand, anti-abortion activists decried the pill as an \easily wielded tool of infanticide."221 Abor-
tion rights advocates nonetheless acknowledged that their victory was an exceedingly fragile one. For one,
the FDA decision came just over a month before the 2000 presidential election. Given this political backdrop,
RU-486's future probably depended on the next occupant of the White House, especially because the politi-
cized nature of the drug could factor heavily into the new President's selection of an FDA Commissioner.
While both candidates stated opinions on the FDA's decision to approve RU-486, neither was willing to ex-
pend political capital on the abortion issue and risk alienating moderate, independent voters.222 Bush called
the decision \wrong," warning, \I fear this abortion pill... will make abortions more common. As president,
I will work to build a culture that respects life."223 However, when asked specically if he would overturn
on the long-term eects of multiple use of the regimen, privacy concerns militated against the implementation of such a study.
See FDC Reports, Mifeprex Label Allows Use by Physicians Not Trained in Surgical Abortion, The Pink Sheet, Oct. 2, 2000.
220American Political Network, American Health Line, Campaign 2000, RU-486: FDA Approval Evokes Political `Tempest',
6 Abortion Rep. No. 9, Sept. 29, 2000, available in WL APN-AB File.
221See Raja Mishra, New Option Marks a Turning Point, Boston Globe, Sept. 29, 2000, at A12.
222On paper, the candidates oered two diametrically opposed perspectives on abortion. While Al Gore is a supporter of
abortion rights, George Bush is on record supporting a constitutional amendment that would outlaw abortion except in cases
of rape, incest, or when the life of the mother is in danger. See Robin Toner, The 2000 Campaign: Focus On The Issues,
Both Sides on Abortion Issue Step Up Fight, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2000, at A29. George Bush's political adroitness, however,
allowed him to give these reassurances to the pro-life movement, while nevertheless occasioning speculation on how fervently
he would pursue this agenda. For example, he said that in making appointments to the Supreme Court he would look for strict
constructionists like Justices Scalia and Thomas but painstakingly avoided saying that he would appoint only Justices who
would seek to overturn Roe v. Wade. See Robin Toner, The 2000 Campaign: Focus On The Issues, Both Sides on Abortion
Issue Step Up Fight, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2000, at A29.
223See American Political Network, American Health Line, Campaign 2000, RU-486: FDA Approval Evokes Political 'Tempest',
6 Abortion Rep. No. 9, Sept. 29, 2000, available in WL APN-AB File.
45the FDA's decision, Bush's campaign spokesperson, Scott McClellan, stated [i]t appears the president does
not have the authority to order drugs o the market. As president, he would order a careful review to ensure
that the FDA considered all the risks and did not do this as a result of political pressure from the White
House."224 Al Gore, on the other hand, contended that \[t]he FDA's decision is not about politics, but the
health and safety of American women and a woman's fundamental right to choose."225 Thus, it was evident
that if Gore was elected president, the status quo on the FDA's decision to approve RU-486 would remain
in place.
B. The House and Senate Get Involved Again
Furthermore, on the legislative front, the fragility of the abortion victory was readily apparent. With RU-486
now having approved status, anti-abortion members of Congress realized that rollback of the FDA's decision
would not be easy. In theory, however, Congress could pursue a number of dierent avenues in an eort to
accomplish this goal. First, Congress could instruct the Drug Enforcement Administration to classify RU-486
as a dangerous substance having adverse consequences to a woman's health. This could be accomplished by
reinterpreting the existing safety data and by emphasizing the fact that most women experience bleeding and
uterine pain.226 Second, Congress could encourage the Secretary of Health and Human Services to declare
the drug an \imminent hazard to health" on the grounds that it ends the life of an unborn child.227 Third
and nally, the Department of Health and Human Services could seek to withdraw the drug from the market
if the government's restrictions on distribution are not followed.228
Because such eorts have been unsuccessful in the past and because the FDA generally reconsiders drug
approvals only when new evidence arises that places into doubt the drug's safety or eectiveness, the pro-life
224See Robin Toner, Joy and Outrage, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2000, at A1.
225See American Political Network, American Health Line, Campaign 2000, RU-486: FDA Approval Evokes Political 'Tempest',
6 Abortion Rep. No. 9, Sept. 29, 2000, available in WL APN-AB File.
226See Sarah Lueck, Abortion Foes Face Tough Battle Against RU-486 Drug, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A28.
227Society: The Abortion Pill, Newsweek Int'l, Oct. 9, 2000.
228See Sarah Lueck, Abortion Foes Face Tough Battle Against RU-486 Drug, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A28.
46members of Congress decided instead to focus their legislative activity on restricting the availability of the
drug. For instance, on October 4, 2000, in the 106th Congress, Representative Tom Coburn of Oklahoma
and Senator Tim Hutchinson of Arkansas introduced the RU-486 Patient Health and Safety Act.229 This
Act would require administering physicians to complete an FDA-approved program before becoming RU-486
abortion providers. The proposed bill also required licensed physicians to be qualied to handle complica-
tions resulting from an incomplete or ectopic pregnancy; to be trained to perform surgical abortions; to be
certied for ultrasound dating and detection of ectopic pregnancies; and to be able to admit patients at
emergency care facilities no more than one hour away from their treatment sites.230
C. Chinese Manufacturer Creates Public Image Problems
In addition to the anti-abortion legislative activity that sprung up in the wake of RU-486's approval, another
controversy erupted which tarnished the drug's public image and threatened the drug's acceptance within
the medical community and the general public. When news leaked out that the previously undisclosed
manufacturer of the drug is Shanghai Hua Lian Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., an entity owned by the Chinese
government, anti-abortion passions were inamed. Senator Hutchinson's remarks immediately following this
disclosure evidenced the intensity of anti-abortion passions:
229See To Require the Food and Drug Administration to Establish Restrictions Regarding the Qualications of Physicians
to Prescribe the Abortion Drug Commonly Known as RU-486, S. 3157, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. and H.R. 5385 106th Cong.,
2d Sess.; see also FDC Reports, Searle/FDA Cytotec Labeling Negotiations Continue Ahead of Mifeprex Launch, The Pink
Sheet, Oct. 9, 2000. After this legislation was not enacted in the 106th Congess, Senator Hutchinson and Representative David
Vitter, a Republican from Louisiana, reintroduced it in the 107th Congress on February 6, 2001. See FDC Reports, RU-486
Lower Dose, Home-Administered Misoprostol Being Evaluated, The Pink Sheet, Feb. 12, 2001. Presently, the legislation is still
pending.
230See FDC Reports, Searle/FDA Cytotec Labeling Negotiations Continue Ahead of Mifeprex Launch, The Pink Sheet, Oct.
9, 2000. All of these requirements had been seriously considered by the FDA before it granted its approval to RU-486 and were
ultimately rejected.
47China is well known as the leading proliferator of weapons of mass de-
struction. China has given new meaning to the term with the conrmation
that a Chinese government rm will be the manufacturer of the recently
approved RU-486 drug. China will add death and destruction to its list of
exports. It is telling that no U.S. rm would manufacture the drug and
that the FDA had to look to the home of forced abortion and the notorious
one-child policy to nd a manufacturer for the U.S. market.231
On another front, another abortion opponent, Douglas Johnson of the National Right to Life Committee,
stated that the FDA could not adequately monitor the manufacturing processes of the Chinese factory given
the factory's remote location.232 This concern was further magnied when the House of Representatives
began investigating allegations that in the recent past China had shipped tainted and mislabeled drugs into
the United States.233 Conservative members of the House and Senate bolstered their claims by citing to
numerous examples of problems involving the manufacturing of drugs by the Chinese.234 Needless to say,
this interlude did not cause RU-486 to garner popularity from the general public.
D. Bush Elected President
Finally, the election of George W. Bush to the Presidency of the United States signaled
perhaps the single most important factor in a potential change in domestic abortion policy
and the legal status of RU-486. Although during the campaign President Bush had expressed
his belief that he could not reverse the FDA's prior decision, his actions after securing the
presidential victory caused abortion advocates to fret. For example, on January 23, 2001
(the 28th anniversary of Roe v. Wade), he addressed a crowd gathered for the annual March for Life,
232See id.
233See id.
234According to House investigators, betamethasone phosphate, a drug produced by Hua Lian for use in skin creams and
asthma drugs, had been detained in Cincinnati by FDA ocials earlier in the year because of false labeling. See Aaron Zitner,
RU-486 Firm Linked to Drug Impurities Investigation: Chinese Company That Produces Abortion Pill for U.S. Market Was
Cited for Violation of Federal Laws, L.A. Times, Oct. 20, 2000, at A29. In addition, a study conducted by the California
Department of Health Services in 1998 found that high levels of contamination were present in an herbal remedy called composite
tegafuri capsules and hundreds of similar products, all of which had been produced at the Hua Lian plant in China. See id. To
further support allegations of plant integrity problems, Representative Thomas J. Bliley alerted the FDA to a report by one of
its own ocials who had inspected the Shanghai plant in October 1999, which found the existence of data integrity problems
at the plant. See id.
48via Representative Christopher H. Smith, a Republican from New Jersey, who transmitted the President's
statement to the assembly:
We share a great goal: to work toward a day when every child is welcomed
in life and protected in law. We know that this will not come easily or all
at once, but the goal leads us onward, to build a culture of life, arming
that every person and every stage and season of life, is created equally in
God's image.235
On that same day, in a symbolic move, reversing what President Clinton had done eight years earlier,
President Bush reinstated a ban on federal assistance to international organizations that \actively promote
abortion as a method of family planning."236
Furthermore, the new President's disinclination to maintain RU-486's legal status was evidenced by his
appointment of former Wisconsin Governor, Tommy G. Thompson, a conservative opponent of abortion,
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, the department which oversees the FDA.237
At his conrmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Mr.
Thompson assured the Committee that he would not roll back the FDA's decision unless RU-486 was proven
to be unsafe.238 He also added, however, that signicant evidence of safety concerns existed that justied
a fresh review of the FDA's approval process.239 Thompson's stated position at his conrmation hearing
allowed him wide latitude to either maintain the status quo on RU-486 or order his agency to conduct a
new evaluation of the FDA's decision to approve RU-486. Regardless of what was said at his conrmation
hearings, it did not take long for Thompson to come to a decision on RU-486. On January 20, 2001,
236See id.
237See David E. Sanger, The 43rd President: The Transition; New Picks Firm up Conservative Cast of Bush's Cabinet, N.
Y. Times, Dec. 30, 2000, at A1.
238See Robert Pear, Transition in Washington: Health and Human Services; Thompson Says He Will Order A New Review
Of Abortion Drug, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 2001, at A17.
239See id.
49Thompson announced that he would conduct a new review of the safety of the abortion pill.240
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the nal chapter in the RU-486 saga remains to be written. How that nal chapter will be
written remains to be seen. While the FDA's approval of RU-486 as a treatment regimen in the United
States would seemingly end the debate over the drug's future, if there has been one constant throughout
this drug's 20-year history, it is that whenever a resolution appears to have been reached, another signicant
issue or controversy develops soon thereafter. The question is what will cause the next signicant issue or
controversy. Will scientic and technological advances in the 21st century oer a treatment regimen that far
surpasses the benets of RU-486, and, as a result, moot this whole issue? Will the pro-life movement in the
United States focus its eorts on staging a boycott of the drug companies associated with RU-486 { like the
pro-life movement in France did in 1988 { thereby forcing drug companies to disassociate themselves from the
drug? Will RU-486 cause some presently unknown health ailment and subject the companies associated with
it to the same huge liability costs that befell the entities responsible for other contraceptive and reproductive
products such as Ortho-Gynol, Dalkon Shield, and Copper-7 in the 1980's? Will abortion rights groups
unite, like they have done in the past, to prevent the imposition of any restrictions on the accessibility of
RU-486 and transform RU-486 into a battleground issue? Will the U.S. Supreme Court become much more
conservative on abortion issues over the next few years, especially with a Republican president making all
future nomination decisions, overturn Casey and Roe, and roll back abortion rights, eectively eliminating
the use of RU-486? Will the distributors and manufacturers of RU-486 self-destruct and become embroiled
in lawsuits against one another (e.g., what resulted from the drug's association with Joseph Pike and Gedeon
240See id.
50Richter)? Will the new political composition in Washington, with the Republican Party holding majorities
in both legislative branches, become more proactive on issues involving RU-486 and enact similar legislative
initiatives to the bills sponsored in the past by Rep. Coburn and Sen. Hutchinson? Will the HHS, under
the leadership of Tommy Thompson, conduct a new review of the safety and ecacy of RU-486 and attempt
to cause the reversal of the FDA's prior decision to approve the drug?
Based on this Paper's chronology of RU-486's prior history, each one of the aforementioned scenarios is
possibly in the future for RU-486. My own prediction is that RU-486 will remain on the U.S. market, despite
some of the inclinations of the new executive administration. Undoubtedly, the normative debate over the
morality of abortion will persist as it should given that the termination of human life or potential human
life, however one sees it, is an issue of the utmost gravity. In the end, however, I predict that the conclusion
will be reached that Roe v. Wade is settled law. This, in turn, will leave the abortion landscape virtually
unaltered, with one signicant modication, the addition of a new method of abortion in the United States
in the form of RU-486. Yet, as shown throughout this Paper, any assumptions regarding the last chapter of
the RU-486 story is foolhardy.
Even with these looming questions and possibilities in mind, the chapters of RU-486's story delineated in
this Paper have illuminated at least one certainty: RU-486 is not merely a story about the scientic merits
of a new drug. If that had been the case, the FDA approval process would have taken far less time than it
did because the evidence from both the French and U.S. clinical trials overwhelmingly mitigated in favor of
RU-486's approval as a safe and eective drug for its indicated uses. Instead, the RU-486 story has really
been a symbolic ght over a most controversial and delicate subject that reached the forefront of our political
landscape 28 years ago in one of the Supreme Court's most momentous opinions, Roe v. Wade. The ght
over the morality of abortion has pitted two warring ideologies against one another, one which advocates
the need to preserve a woman's reproductive autonomy, the other which espouses the moral imperative to
51preserve the sanctity of all human life, including fetal human life.
In the end, in spite of these political, ideological, and moral disagreements and the various plot twists during
the drug's history, I believe that the FDA fullled its congressional mandate. The FDA followed the dictates
of science and the law and was not held hostage to political, moral, or ideological pressure. As a matter of
pure science and law then, which should be the FDA's paramount concern, the RU-486 approval decision
was appropriate because the scientic evidence available demonstrated that RU-486 satised the statutory
requirements of \safety" and \ecacy" for its intended uses. As a moral matter, however, a province wholly
outside the FDA's jurisdiction, the question surrounding RU-486's approval is much more complex. It
involves a plethora of considerations, most importantly the cultural and moral implications of living in a
society where the termination of either human life or potential human life is legally permitted. This grave
complexity explains why RU-486's entrance into the U.S. pharmaceutical market took over a decade and
created the basis for a most interesting and convoluted tale.
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